Bridgemere Land Limited & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Transport

At the permission stage of judicial review, the court asks whether the claim is arguable with a realistic prospect of success and whether any other bar applies. Permission does not determine the merits. An Article 31 direction may arguably be unlawful if, in substance, it safeguards land for public development in circumstances engaging the statutory blight regime while being expressed to avoid that regime. A temporary restriction on granting planning permission may also arguably constitute an interference or control of property use when assessed in substance rather than form, even though it involves no deprivation and does not prevent permission. Permission was therefore granted on all grounds, including alleged failure to consider the claimants’ impacts.

The claimants, housebuilding companies, sought judicial review of a direction made by the Secretary of State for Transport under Article 31 of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015. The direction prevented Warrington Borough Council from granting planning permission for six months in respect of land allocated for residential development. The direction followed discussions about acquiring the land for a possible rail link.

The claim alleged improper purpose, irrationality or failure to consider mandatory impacts, and incompatibility with Article 1 of the ECHR Protocol 1. The claimants argued that the direction was in substance a safeguarding measure which should have engaged the blight provisions in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The issue at this stage was whether the grounds were arguable with a realistic prospect of success and whether any other bar applied.

Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on all grounds.

1. The court applied the permission-stage threshold: a claim must be arguable with a realistic prospect of success, and there must be no other bar to permission. Granting permission records only that threshold conclusion on limited materials. The substantive merits remain for determination after fuller evidence and argument.
2. The statutory context was the power under section 74(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to authorise directions restricting the grant of planning permission, implemented here through Article 31(1) of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015. Section 149 and Schedule 13 to the 1990 Act contain the blight provisions. The court proceeded on the parties’ apparent position that those provisions depended on the stated purpose of the direction, while noting that this was not obvious and was not finally decided.
3. Ground 1 was arguable. It was reasonably arguable that an Article 31 direction made in fact to safeguard land for development for relevant public functions, but expressed so as not to trigger the blight provisions, was unlawful. It was also arguable on the disclosed ministerial submissions that the Secretary of State was acting to safeguard the land, since a specific safeguarding direction had been identified as an available option.
4. Ground 2, alleging inadequate consideration of the impacts on the claimants, was also arguable because the documents left scope to debate whether the extent of those impacts had been recognised.
5. Ground 3 was more marginal. The direction did not deprive the claimants of their property or prevent planning permission; it delayed its grant for six months. Nevertheless, it was sufficiently arguable that, viewed as a matter of substance rather than form, the direction involved an interference or control of property use, as explained in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 25.
6. The court declined to narrow the grant because some arguments were stronger than others. The later renewal of the direction also showed that the claim was not academic and supported urgent substantive directions.