Balvir Singh Pardesi v Gurdeep Pardesi

A stay pending appeal requires the court to balance the risk of injustice to each party. An appellant who says payment would stifle the appeal must provide full and frank evidence of means showing an inability to pay; general assertions are insufficient. Where an appellant can pay an order made after trial, compliance is the starting point absent good reason. The court also considers the risk to enforcement if a stay is granted and the appeal fails, and the risk of being unable to recover payment if the appeal succeeds. Interest does not fully remove a judgment creditor’s prejudice from delayed payment. A stay was refused where the applicant could pay and produced no evidence that payment would stifle the appeal or prove irrecoverable.

Balvir Singh Pardesi, the appellant and father of the respondent, sought a stay of an order requiring him to pay about £358,000 in rent and interest relating to two investment properties, along with indemnity costs and an initial payment on account of £110,000. Permission to appeal remained unresolved. Marcus Smith J had refused an earlier stay application on the papers because its grounds were general and unsupported by evidence. The appellant renewed the stay application, relying on the risk that he could not recover money paid if the appeal succeeded and proposing security and an expedited appeal. The issue was whether the competing risks of injustice justified delaying enforcement.

1. Application refused. The court had not been asked to determine the merits of the appeal and assumed, for this application, that it was not fanciful.
2. Applicable framework. Hammond Suddards Solicitors v Agrichem International Holdings Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2065 identifies the essential question as whether granting or refusing a stay risks injustice to either party. Ordinarily, the court considers the risk that refusal will stifle the appeal; the risk that a granted stay will leave the respondent unable to enforce if the appeal fails; and the risk that refusal will leave the appellant unable to recover sums paid if the appeal succeeds.
3. Stifling the appeal. A general assertion that enforcement will affect the appeal is insufficient. An appellant relying on inability to pay must provide full and frank evidence of means, giving a complete and clear picture and showing that payment cannot be made. The appellant provided no such evidence. Evidence at trial indicated that his property investments should allow him to comply, and his counsel did not contend otherwise. No risk of the appeal being stifled was established.
4. Recovery and prejudice. The asserted difficulty of recovering payment from the respondent if the appeal succeeded was unsupported by clear evidence. The appellant could not fairly fault the respondent for failing to provide more detail about his assets when the appellant, as applicant, had not disclosed his own means. The proposed undertaking, payment into court and expedited permission application did not alter the balance.
5. Balance and order. Interest would not fully compensate the respondent for being kept out of money awarded after trial. The evidence showed that the appellant could comply, and the order might remain in force after appeal. The ordinary expectation is that a court order made after trial will be obeyed; compliance is not optional merely because an appeal is pending. The respondent’s prejudice outweighed the unsupported risk asserted by the appellant. The stay was refused.

1. High Court (Chancery Division): On 22 June 2026, Adam Johnson J refused the renewed application to stay execution pending appeal. Permission to appeal remained unresolved.
2. High Court, on the papers: Marcus Smith J had refused an earlier stay application, finding its grounds too general. No citation is stated.
3. Order under appeal: HHJ Saunders made the order for rent, interest and costs on 9 March 2026. No citation is stated.