R v Joshua Riviere & Ors

A Voluntary Bill of Indictment after dismissal is an exceptional remedy. The High Court must be satisfied that the new material supports a prima facie case and that re-instituting proceedings is in the interests of justice. There is no rigid definition of fresh evidence; its nature and the circumstances in which it was obtained matter. Prosecutorial delay and disclosure failures weigh against granting the bill, but do not automatically prevent a trial. The central questions are whether a fair trial remains possible and whether continuing would offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety. Where the allegation is serious, the evidence is sufficient, no specific prejudice is shown, and trial safeguards can address delay, the balance may favour granting the bill.

Charges of aggravated burglary against five defendants were dismissed by the Crown Court at Canterbury in July 2024. The prosecution later obtained evidence including glass fragments on one defendant’s shoes, telephone downloads, and additional ANPR and cell-site material. It applied to the High Court in December 2025 for a Voluntary Bill of Indictment. The defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and relied on prosecutorial disclosure failures, delay, abuse of process and the interests of justice. The central issues were whether the new material established a prima facie case against each defendant and whether a fair trial should proceed despite the earlier failures and delay.

1. The application was granted in respect of all five defendants. The application was governed by s.2(2)(b) of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 and paragraph 2(6) of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. A Voluntary Bill is an exceptional procedure and could be granted only if it was in the interests of justice.
2. The approach in R v Davenport and others [2005] EWHC 2828 (QB) was applied. There is no rigid test for fresh evidence. The court must examine the nature of the new material and the circumstances in which it was obtained. It is more difficult for the prosecution where the material could have been produced in the original proceedings. The interests-of-justice test identified in IPE Marble Arch Limited v Moran [2024] EWHC 2913 (KB) and CPS v Walker-Scarlett [2024] EWHC 1266 (KB) was applied.
3. The glass evidence, telephone material, ANPR and cell-site evidence, considered with the original evidence, established a prima facie case. It was unnecessary to prove that each defendant was one of the two men who entered the bedroom, entered the property, or stood by the broken doors. It was sufficient that a defendant might have gone to the area and encouraged or assisted another participant. A jury could also consider evidence about one occupant of the Ford Focus when deciding the purpose of the group.
4. The prosecution had failed to comply with disclosure obligations, had not obtained important material promptly, and had taken too long to make the application. Those matters weighed significantly against granting it. However, the allegations were serious, there was a strong public interest in prosecution, no specific prejudice was identified, and a fair trial remained possible.
5. Under Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48, a stay for abuse of process may be required where a fair trial is impossible or where proceeding would offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety. Neither category was established. Even if the reasonable-time requirement had been breached, the case was not exceptional in the relevant sense. The effect of delay could be addressed at bail and, if necessary, sentencing, as recognised in Attorney General's Reference (No.2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68.
6. The balance therefore favoured allowing the proceedings to continue. After Mr Jones’s representatives made no further submissions, the application was granted for all five defendants.

This was a first-instance application rather than an appeal. The judgment described the following procedural history:

• Crown Court at Canterbury: applications to dismiss the aggravated-burglary charges were granted for four defendants on 12 July 2024 and for the fifth defendant on 19 July 2024.
• High Court (King’s Bench Division): the Voluntary Bill application was lodged on 19 December 2025 and granted in respect of all five defendants on 22 July 2026.