M (A Child: Non-Convention State, Pakistan Protocol, summary return), Re

In a summary-return application concerning a child from a non-Hague Convention country, the High Court must apply the welfare principle to the individual child. Summary return is neither automatic nor founded on a presumption in favour of repatriation. The court should undertake a swift, realistic and unsentimental welfare assessment, including the child’s connection with each country, time spent there, the ability of the foreign court to decide long-term welfare, and the effect on the primary carer. The Pakistan Protocol may guide the assessment outside its strict terms, but it cannot displace welfare as the decisive question. Adequate day-to-day care in England is not determinative where continued separation from a primary attachment figure risks emotional harm and return better serves the child’s welfare.

The Mother applied under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court for the summary return of M, aged three, from England to Pakistan. Pakistan is not a contracting state to the Hague Convention 1980. The Father opposed the application, asserting that the Mother had consented to M’s indefinite relocation and that M was well cared for in England.

The court considered whether consent had been limited to temporary travel, whether the Father had promised M’s return after six months, whether there was a realistic plan for family migration, whether allegations about the Mother’s parenting were established, and whether M’s welfare required summary return. The central issue was the welfare outcome for M in the absence of automatic Convention repatriation.

1. Disposition. The application was granted. M’s welfare required his return to Pakistan within 14 days. He was to remain a Ward of Court pending implementation, after which questions concerning his long-term welfare were to be determined by the courts of Pakistan.
2. Applicable approach. Pakistan was not a Hague Convention contracting state. The court therefore applied the inherent jurisdiction and the welfare principle to M as an individual child. Hague Convention principles and automatic repatriation did not apply. The judge applied the approach in Re J (A Child) (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights) [2005] UKHL 40 and Re O (Summary Return Non Convention Country) [2025] EWCA Civ 660: summary return required a swift, realistic and unsentimental welfare assessment, not a presumption in favour of return.
3. Pakistan Protocol. The strict provisions of the Pakistan Protocol were not engaged because there was no custody, residence, restraint or interdict order. Its spirit and welfare-oriented guidance were nevertheless relevant, consistently with Re H (Child Abduction: Mother’s Asylum) [2003] EWHC 1820, Y v S [2017] EWHC 1020 (Fam), NG v. CJ [2024] EWHC 338 and Re C (A Child: Summary Return to Pakistan) [2025] EWHC 1427 (Fam). The Protocol remained guidance only, and the judge stated that the same welfare conclusion would have been reached without it.
4. Findings. The Mother had not consented to permanent separation. The Father had represented that M would travel temporarily for medical assessment and would return within six months, and had taken advantage of the Mother’s vulnerability. There was no realistic or developed family-migration plan. The allegations of mental-health difficulties and neglect were unsupported; the burn injury was accidental and the Father’s conduct after it was inconsistent with an ongoing serious safety concern.
5. Welfare balance. The Mother was M’s primary attachment figure and had cared for him for the first two and a half years of his life. Video contact could not substitute for parenting, and there was no realistic prospect of reunification in England. Although the Father met M’s basic physical needs, he was unable to meet his emotional needs or support M’s relationship with the Mother. Short-term disruption on return was outweighed by the prospect of restoring M’s relationship with his primary carer while preserving his relationship with the Father.

• High Court (Family Division): Proceedings were commenced on 17 April 2026. Mr Justice Garrido gave directions on 23 June 2026. Following the hearing on 16–17 July 2026, the court granted the summary-return application. No appeal or lower-court decision is described.