Dr Dean Patterson v General Medical Council

An Interim Orders Tribunal need not establish the facts or finally determine fitness to practise before restricting a doctor’s registration. It must assess whether the information discloses a prima facie case and a real risk to patient safety or the public interest, considering seriousness, likelihood of repetition and the weight of the material. Suspension is permissible where conditions cannot adequately manage the risk. On a statutory appeal, the High Court exercises an original jurisdiction but gives substantial, context-sensitive deference to the expert tribunal and intervenes only if its decision was wrong. Procedural fairness at this stage does not require final-hearing particulars. Freedom of expression and proportionality must be considered, but independent evidence of clinical risk may justify suspension. The challenge was dismissed, without final findings on the allegations.

The Claimant, a consultant physician registered with the GMC, was referred to the GMC after investigations into social-media statements about Covid-19 vaccination, patient-data and consent issues, clinical practice, and compliance with professional processes. An Interim Orders Tribunal considered reports from two MHPS investigations and the Royal College of Physicians, and on 20 February 2026 imposed a 12-month interim suspension, although the GMC had sought conditions. In Part 8 proceedings under Medical Act 1983 s 40, the Claimant challenged the Tribunal’s assessment of risk, procedural fairness, the clinical evidence, freedom of expression, protected-disclosure arguments, the choice of suspension, and the adequacy of its reasons. The central issue was whether the Tribunal’s decision was wrong and whether the High Court should terminate or shorten the order.

1. Disposition. The court dismissed the challenge and upheld the 12-month interim suspension. It made no final findings about the Claimant’s fitness to practise; the matters under investigation remained allegations.
2. Interim role and appellate review. An IOT conducts a risk assessment rather than a final fact-finding exercise. It asks whether the information discloses a prima facie case of impairment and a real risk to patient safety or the public interest. The judge applied R(Ali) v General Medical Council [2008] EWHC 1630 (Admin), Howells v General Medical Council [2015] EWHC 348 (Admin) and I Kumar v General Medical Council [2013] EWHC 452 (Admin). Under Medical Act 1983 s 41A, public-interest orders need not satisfy a strict necessity test, but must be desirable and proportionate. On appeal, the High Court exercises an original jurisdiction but may interfere only if the IOT’s decision was wrong. It starts from the IOT’s decision and gives significant, case-specific deference to its expertise, applying Sandler v General Medical Council [2010] EWHC 1029 (Admin) and related authorities.
3. Process and evidence. The interim procedure did not require final-hearing particulars or discrete findings on every allegation. The notice identifying the 16 matters under investigation, together with the underlying reports, was sufficient. The structured approach required assessment of seriousness, repetition risk, evidential weight, the need for restriction, suspension or conditions, and the proportionate period. The IOT was entitled to treat the RCP and MHPS reports as authoritative and to regard the Claimant’s detailed rebuttals as matters for the final investigation or review. The proposed extension of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583 and Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 was not required at the interim stage.
4. Expression and protected disclosures. The suspension interfered with Article 10(1), but was prescribed by law and pursued public safety and health. The Claimant’s accepted misuse of social media, potentially misleading statements and publication of identifiable patient information reduced the weight of his expressive rights. Independent evidence of clinical risk and advice contrary to patients’ best interests justified the order in any event. The protected-disclosure regime under the Employment Rights Act 1996 was not engaged, and good faith did not eliminate the risk.
5. Conditions and proportionality. The choice between conditions and suspension was quintessentially a matter for the IOT’s expert judgment. Evidence that bias affected the Claimant’s clinical practice, together with concerns about insight and compliance, supported the conclusion that conditions would not adequately manage the risks. The court could consider subsequent developments and fresh evidence, but could not substitute conditions for suspension; it could only terminate or shorten the order. The decision was therefore not wrong.

The Claimant challenged the Interim Orders Tribunal’s decision of 20 February 2026 under Medical Act 1983 s 40. The High Court dismissed the challenge and upheld the interim suspension.