Eunice Aisedu-Baning v Nursing and Midwifery Council

Under article 31(12) of the Nursing & Midwifery Order 2001, an interim suspension order should be revoked or varied only if it is wrong. Where a striking-off order is under substantive appeal, the court must be strongly of the view that the appeal is bound to succeed before treating the interim order as wrong. Serious findings supporting striking off may justify interim suspension even if no earlier interim order was imposed and no later complaints arose. A fairness challenge based on absence through ill health requires particularised medical evidence showing unfitness to participate. Financial hardship and professional uncertainty do not displace a justified protective order.

The applicant, a registered midwife, applied under article 31(12) of the Nursing & Midwifery Order 2001 to revoke an interim suspension order imposed after the Fitness to Practise Committee found misconduct and dishonesty, determined impairment, and ordered striking off. The suspension was intended to operate while her statutory appeal against the striking-off order was pending. She alleged unfairness in a 76-day disciplinary hearing, absence through ill health, delay, financial and health hardship, and improper reliance on the striking-off decision. The respondent relied on public protection and public interest. The central issue was whether the interim order was wrong and should be terminated pending the substantive appeal.

The application for revocation could not succeed.

1. Applicable threshold. Article 31(12) of the Nursing & Midwifery Order 2001 gave the court jurisdiction to terminate or vary the interim order. The court’s role was not confined to judicial review. However, as explained in Sandler v GMC [2010] EWHC 1029, an extant order should be terminated only if it was wrong. Where a substantive appeal against striking off remained outstanding, the court had to be strongly of the view that the appeal was bound to succeed. The court should be slow to treat a decision directed to public protection as wrong.
2. Application of the threshold. The Committee’s findings of misconduct and dishonesty, its finding of impairment, and its conclusion that striking off was the only appropriate sanction justified the interim suspension pending appeal. Reliance on the striking-off decision was not circular. The absence of an earlier interim order, the absence of later concerns and the applicant’s financial and health hardship did not make the interim order wrong. If the substantive appeal succeeded, the interim order would fall away.
3. Fairness and participation. The applicant had been present or represented on many days of the 76-day hearing. Her absence or lack of representation on approximately 16 days did not make the Committee’s findings of voluntary absence and diminished engagement irrational. The earlier refusals of permission for judicial review did not determine the statutory appeal, but the proper route for challenging the substantive determination was that appeal.
4. Ill health. Brabazon-Drenning v UKCC HRLR 6 was considered alongside General Medical Council v Hayat [2018] EWCA Civ 2796. The latter cautioned against treating earlier decisions such as Tait v Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons [2003] UKPC 34 and Norton v Bar Standards Board [2014] EWHC 2681 (Admin) as determinative, in light of General Medical Council v Adeogba [2016] EWCA Civ 162. The governing requirement, stated in Levis v Ellis Carr [2012] EWHC 63, was evidence establishing unfitness to participate, identifying the condition with proper particularity and explaining why it prevented participation. No such medical evidence had been provided.
5. Register and costs. Updating the register to record the striking-off order and then the interim suspension was not illegitimate. The costs decision was adjourned until conclusion of the substantive appeal. Issues concerning later compliance with orders could also be raised at that hearing.

This was a first-instance application under article 31(12) of the Nursing & Midwifery Order 2001. The judgment recorded these prior steps:

• Fitness to Practise Committee: imposed a striking-off order and an interim suspension order after finding misconduct, dishonesty and impairment.
• Administrative Court: refused permission for judicial review on the papers before Mr CMG Ockelton on 5 September 2025 and at a renewed oral hearing before Lang J on 11 December 2025.
• High Court (Administrative Court): refused the application to revoke the interim suspension order. The statutory appeal against the striking-off order remained pending, and costs were adjourned.