Fatima Omar Ali Ahmed Al Hashimi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department

In judicial review, the time limit runs from the date on which the decision is made, rather than when it is communicated. Delayed notification may nevertheless justify an extension where it unfairly prejudices the claimant. Difficulty obtaining specialist legal aid may constitute an objectively good reason, but extension remains an overall assessment involving the importance and merits of the issues, prejudice, detriment to good administration and the public interest.

An allegedly discriminatory nationality scheme does not create a continuing cause of action which indefinitely postpones the judicial review time limit. Article 1 ECHR jurisdiction is primarily territorial. A person living abroad, without family or private life in the United Kingdom, cannot rely on the effects of a British nationality decision alone to establish jurisdiction. CEDAW is not directly enforceable in domestic courts.

The claimant, a Somali national living in the United Arab Emirates, challenged the refusal to register her as a British Overseas Citizen. Her mother had been a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by birth in Aden, but the statutory scheme historically permitted transmission of nationality by descent through fathers and not mothers.

The claim was filed about seven months after the review decision. The court considered extension of time, the claimant’s challenge under Articles 14 and 8 ECHR, and an intended reliance on CEDAW. The central issues were whether time ran from the date of the decision or its receipt, whether the court had jurisdiction over the Convention claim, and whether CEDAW created enforceable domestic rights.

1. Extension of time. The grounds for judicial review arose when the Defendant made the review decision on 5 June 2024, not when the decision was received on 9 July 2024. CPR r.54.5(1) therefore applied from the earlier date. The delayed posting was unfairly prejudicial and justified extending time at least to 8 October 2024.
2. Difficulty finding a suitably experienced legal aid solicitor was an objectively good reason for delay. Delay in obtaining legal aid funding was also capable of contributing to a sufficient reason, but was not decisive. The court considered the length of delay, absence of fault, absence of prejudice or detriment to good administration, the arguable merits and the public interest in determining the issue. An extension to 17 January 2025 was granted.
3. The concept of a continuing situation under R (Johnson) v Home Secretary [2016] UKSC 56, [2017] AC 365 is distinct from domestic judicial review time limits. Continuing discriminatory effects did not make the claim indefinitely in time, although they were relevant to the discretionary extension application.
4. Convention jurisdiction. Jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR is primarily territorial. The claimant lived outside the United Kingdom, had no family or private life there, would not obtain a right of abode, and experienced the effects of the decision abroad. The fact that a UK Minister made the decision under UK legislation did not provide the necessary jurisdictional connection. Ground 1 was arguable, so permission was granted, but the substantive claim was dismissed.
5. The issue of a passport and its associated benefits could fall within the ambit of private life under Article 8 ECHR, but that did not overcome the jurisdictional threshold. CEDAW had not been incorporated into domestic law and created no enforceable rights in the domestic courts. Ground 2 was unarguable and permission was refused. The claim was dismissed.

This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. Permission was granted on Ground 1, but the substantive claim was dismissed. Permission was refused on Ground 2.