C (A Child: Relocation to Sweden), Re

In an application for a child’s international relocation, the child’s welfare is paramount under the Children Act 1989. There is no presumption for or against the relocating parent. The court must make a global, holistic comparison of the realistic options, considering the welfare checklist, the child’s wishes and feelings, parental capacity, family and cultural connections, continuity, accommodation and future contact. Parents’ Article 8 rights form part of that welfare balance; a separate proportionality cross-check is unnecessary. Clear wishes may carry significant weight where the child has sufficient age and maturity. Uncertainty about future arrangements does not prevent a welfare decision where the competing plans can fairly be evaluated.

The applicant mother and respondent father, both Swedish nationals, were parents of a nine-year-old girl born and raised in Sweden. By agreement, the child moved to England in January 2025 to live temporarily with her father. Contact later broke down. The mother’s application for summary return under the Hague Convention 1980 was refused in March 2026 because the child was habitually resident in England, although her retention had become wrongful. The mother then sought permission for the child to relocate to Sweden. The father opposed the application and proposed that she remain in England. The central issue was where the child’s welfare lay after a full assessment of the competing arrangements.

Application granted. The mother was permitted to relocate the child to Sweden. The parties were encouraged to agree arrangements for the child to spend time with her father, initially in Sweden and later in England. Directions would be required if agreement could not be reached.

Legal approach

1. The earlier Hague Convention proceedings did not involve a full welfare assessment. The relocation application required a separate assessment of the child’s best interests.
2. Adopting the legal summary in Re O (Domestic Abuse: International Relocation) [2025] EWCA Civ 888, the court applied the welfare principle in the Children Act 1989. Welfare was paramount, there was no presumption in favour of the applicant parent, and the realistic options had to be compared through a global, holistic evaluation. Article 8 rights formed part of that welfare balance rather than requiring a separate proportionality cross-check. Although section 1(2A) does not formally apply to a section 13 application, its focus on parental involvement heightened scrutiny of the proposed arrangements.
3. The child’s recent wishes and feelings were authentic and unequivocal. Given her age and maturity, they were entitled to significant weight. The court found that returning to Sweden would not harm her and that overriding her wish to live with her mother would damage her emotional wellbeing.
4. The court compared both options. Sweden offered the child her established home, school, language, wider family and deeper connection. England offered continuity at school and her relationship with her half-brother. Those advantages were weighed against the unsuitable accommodation in England, the father’s temper, his past restriction of contact and concerns about his future willingness to facilitate the mother’s relationship with the child. The mother’s earlier decision to leave the child in England for a prolonged period and the uncertainties concerning future accommodation and relationships were also considered.
5. The balance favoured relocation. The mother was assessed as better able to meet the child’s medium- and long-term needs, and arrangements could be made to preserve the child’s relationship with her father.

This was a first-instance relocation application. In March 2026, the court refused the mother’s application for summary return under the Hague Convention 1980, finding that the child was habitually resident in England, although her retention had become wrongful from 1 July 2025. The present judgment proceeded to a separate full welfare assessment.