CGM, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Defence

A public authority must apply its lawful policy according to its objective meaning and purpose, and a person is entitled to have their case considered under it even if the policy is undisclosed. Under a narrowly targeted relocation policy, eligibility requiring a high-profile role and equivalent highest risk caused by a data breach is not established merely by personal danger, Taliban attention, or proximity to protected figures. The relevant questions must be considered evaluatively, not as mechanical box-ticking, but a broad discretion permits more than one rational answer. Secret decision-making and short reasons do not necessarily create procedural unfairness where the policy contemplated later review and the reasons, read with the underlying material, disclose a rational flow. Once the policy is revoked because its factual risk premise has collapsed, judicial review cannot sensibly require a fresh decision under it.

The claimant, an Afghan national, sought judicial review of a Ministry of Defence caseworker’s decision that he was ineligible for relocation under the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR). His case depended on condition B(iii), concerning a different high-profile role not listed in the policy. He relied on evidence of Presidential security, military training, protection of senior officials and Taliban targeting.

He alleged misapplication and irrational application of the unpublished policy, and procedural unfairness because he was not told of the policy or invited to provide further evidence. The ARR was discontinued after an independent review, and no right of review operated. The central issues were whether the decision lawfully applied the high-profile-role and equivalent-risk criteria, whether the procedure was fair, and whether any effective remedy remained after closure.

1. Review framework. The claim was dismissed. The court applied the principles in Mandalia v Home Secretary [2015] UKSC 59 and the principles summarised in R (CHD) v Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 566 (Admin). A lawful policy must be honoured unless there is good reason not to do so. Its meaning is an objective question of law for the court. Rationality review includes both defects in the reasoning process and an outcome outside the range of rational decisions.
2. Construction of condition B(iii). The ARR was confined to the highest-risk cohort whose risk was caused or enhanced by the data breach. Condition B(iii) required both a high-profile role and risk equivalent to that facing holders of the listed roles. The policy did not require the role itself to be equivalent to a listed role. The court followed the relevant construction in R (CHD) v Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 1744 (Admin) and considered R (CX1) v Secretary of State for Defence [2024] EWHC 892.
3. Application. Whether a role was high-profile was evaluative. Seniority could be relevant, although it was not a mandatory requirement. Personal danger, Taliban attention, or proximity to high-profile individuals did not by themselves establish a high-profile role. A military connection was neither required nor determinative. A personal protection role could rationally be distinguished from a strategic or proactive counter-terrorism role. The four questions in the guidance were not mechanical box-ticking; they had to be evaluated by reference to equivalent highest risk. The evidence permitted the conclusion that the claimant’s role was not high-profile and did not expose him to equivalent risk as a result of the breach.
4. Procedural fairness. The secrecy of the policy and the super-injunction did not, in the circumstances, make the decision unfair. The short-form reasons were intelligible when read with the underlying material and showed a rational flow from the evidence to the conclusion. The policy contemplated a later review once its existence became public. The loss of that review resulted from the unchallenged termination of the policy, rather than unfairness during its operation.
5. Remedy. The court considered the alternative position that, even if there had been a public law defect, the claim was academic. After closure, the causal-risk premise of the ARR had collapsed. A fresh decision could not sensibly be made on the fiction that the scheme remained operative, and procedural review could not be used as a collateral challenge to the terms of its closure. The claim for judicial review was dismissed.

not stated in the judgment.