ST, R (on the application of) v Carmarthenshire County Council

For a rural-school closure in Wales, the School Organisation Code creates a procedural presumption against closure and requires a strong case. The authority must identify the challenges, explore and assess reasonable alternatives, conscientiously consider objections, and be satisfied that closure is the most appropriate response. A formatting error does not remove that requirement. A socio-economic duty is not breached merely because statutory guidance is not expressly mentioned. The question is whether, in substance, due regard was given; the guidance cannot enlarge the statutory duty, and compliance does not require formulaic decision-making. The court rejected challenges based on financial information, the rural-closure standard and the socio-economic duty, and refused permission.

The claimant, a pupil at Ysgol Llansteffan, sought judicial review of Carmarthenshire County Council’s decision to discontinue the rural Welsh-medium primary school and redesignate its catchment area to Ysgol Llangain.

The claimant alleged process irrationality arising from outdated financial information, failure to recognise the strong-case requirement for rural school closure under the School Organisation Code, and breach of the socio-economic duty in section 1 of the Equality Act 2010. The claim was heard at an expedited rolled-up hearing. The central issues were whether the Council applied the correct legal standards and whether its decision-making process lawfully addressed the financial, educational, community and socio-economic consequences of closure.

Permission was refused on all three grounds. No quashing order was made.

1. Financial case. Applying the process-irrationality approach in R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin), the court held that the funding figures said to follow pupils were not savings or supplements. The stated savings excluded those sums, and transport costs had been taken into account. The Council had also considered updated pupil numbers, capacity at Ysgol Llangain, possible investment and the effect of new housing. There was no material factual error, misunderstanding or methodological flaw. Ground 1 was not reasonably arguable.
2. Rural-school closure. The reference in section 1.8 of the School Organisation Code to the case for closure being strong was a mandatory requirement under section 38(4)(a) of the School Standards and Organisation (Wales) Act 2013. The absence of bold type was an editing error. Following the common-sense approach to the Code described in R (Rhieni Dros Addysg Gymraeg) v Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council [2022] EWHC 2674 (Admin), the requirement was met where the authority started from the presumption against closure, identified the challenges, assessed reasonable alternatives including federation, considered objections conscientiously, and decided that closure was the most appropriate response. The Council had done so. Whether the evidence made the case sufficiently strong was a merits challenge, not an error of legal approach.
3. Socio-economic duty. Guidance issued under section 1(2A) of the Equality Act 2010 could not enlarge or modify the duty in section 1(1). Although the Council did not expressly mention the Guidance, the Proposal Paper and the Integrated Impact Assessment were structured in accordance with it. Applying the analogous principles in R (End Violence Against Women Coalition) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] EWCA Civ 350 and R (Hurley & Moore) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2012] EWHC 201 (Admin), due regard required a conscientious focus on the relevant considerations, not formulaic wording or express statutory citation. The Council had discharged the duty.
4. Obiter remedy observations. The court stated that, if Grounds 2 and 3 had been established, permission would nevertheless have been refused under section 31(3D) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. If Ground 1 had succeeded, the court would probably have declined to apply that provision. In any event, undue delay and the largely completed reorganisation would have justified refusing a quashing order in the interests of good administration.

not stated in the judgment.