CJ, R (on the application of) v Worcestershire County Council

Under the Children Act 1989, judicial review examines the rationality of a local authority’s reasoning rather than substituting the court’s professional judgment. Process rationality requires consideration of mandatory relevant matters, exclusion of irrelevant matters, and reasoning free from logical errors, critical gaps and unexplained evidential leaps. A phased plan to develop a disabled child’s independence may justify withdrawing external care where it is supported by evidence, structured assistance and continued provision during transition. Parental vulnerability, difficult living conditions and cultural circumstances must be addressed, but do not automatically require indefinite external provision. An Article 8 ECHR claim cannot operate as a collateral challenge to an earlier package where its withdrawal was lawful.

This first-instance judicial review concerned a 16-year-old disabled child living with his parents in a touring caravan as part of the fairground showmen community. Worcestershire County Council had provided three weekly hotel bathing sessions with carers while the family travelled. Updated assessments concluded that the child could develop the skills to use the caravan’s shower and cassette toilet with parental support, and that the care package should be phased out.

The claimant challenged the assessments under the Children Act 1989, alleging process irrationality and breach of Article 8 ECHR. The central issues were whether the assessments failed to engage with the parents’ health and mental health, practical and cultural circumstances, and proposal for more care, and whether the reasoning contained a critical gap or evidential leap.

The claim was dismissed.

1. Statutory and public law framework. Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 required the authority to assess the needs of a disabled child, while section 17ZD required assessment of a parent carer’s support needs and the appropriateness of continuing care. The authority was responsible for deciding the child’s needs and the provision required, subject to ordinary public law principles. The court applied the approach stated in BDH v Lambeth Borough Council [2025] EWHC 2568 (Admin) at [9].
2. Process rationality. The court applied R (KP) v SSFCO [2025] EWHC 370 (Admin) at [55]. The question was whether the reasoning contained a logical error, critical gap or unexplained evidential leap, not whether the assessment was correct or whether the court would have reached the same professional judgment.
3. Assessment and phased support. The authority had considered the parents’ concerns about the caravan’s facilities, flooding, toileting, travelling lifestyle and parental health. It relied on evidence from school, carers and care records showing that the child could perform substantial elements of washing, drying and dressing, with varying levels of prompting. Continuing hotel bathing provision while family support workers developed those skills provided a realistic phased plan and avoided any material gap between present difficulty and anticipated independence.
4. Parental needs and additional care. The assessments recognised the father’s suicidal ideation and the mother’s physical illnesses. The authority was entitled to conclude that those difficulties did not automatically require indefinite external bathing provision. The proposal for more carers did not address the practical problems affecting the existing package or the continued use of the caravan toilet. R (TS) v Hackney LBC [2023] EWHC 3063 (Admin) was distinguishable because, in that case, the assessment had failed to explain how the family’s crisis would be resolved or engage in detail with the proposal for more care.
5. Article 8. The Article 8 challenge was in substance a collateral challenge to the adequacy and operation of a pre-existing package which had continued under interim relief. The proper question was whether the decision to withdraw the package was lawful. Since it was lawful, the Article 8 ground was unsustainable.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Interim relief preserving the status quo was granted on 17 October 2025 and permission was granted on 12 November 2025. No earlier judgment or appeal is stated.