His Majesty's Attorney General for England and Wales v Alvida Harrold

A civil proceedings order under Senior Courts Act 1981, section 42 is available where the respondent has instituted vexatious civil proceedings or made vexatious applications habitually or persistently. The inquiry is principally objective and considers the merits of the proceedings, their effect on defendants and the administration of justice, and the cumulative history of conduct. An honest belief in injustice does not prevent proceedings from being vexatious. A civil proceedings order is compatible with Article 6 where it regulates, rather than extinguishes, access to court, pursues a legitimate aim, and remains proportionate.

The Attorney General applied for a civil proceedings order against the respondent under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The respondent had pursued extensive litigation concerning her dismissal from employment and subsequent removal from the nursing register, and had been subject to a general civil restraint order since 2016.

The Trust and the Nursing and Midwifery Council applied to be joined. The respondent applied for adjournments and disclosure, together with orders seeking to reopen earlier litigation and initiate investigations and contempt proceedings. The central issue was whether the statutory conditions for a civil proceedings order were satisfied and whether such an order would unlawfully interfere with Article 6 rights.

1. Adjournment and disclosure. The court refused the respondent’s repeated applications to adjourn. The evidence did not establish an inability to participate, and the nature of the hearing permitted the court to proceed on the written evidence and submissions already made. The disclosure and related applications sought largely to reopen concluded litigation or matters outside the court’s jurisdiction and were irrelevant to the statutory issues.
2. Joinder. The applications by the Trust and the Nursing and Midwifery Council under CPR 19.2 were refused. Their interests and factual knowledge were legitimate, but their participation was unnecessary because the relevant evidence was already before the court and the Attorney General, acting in the public interest, could present the application without partisan intervention.
3. Statutory criteria. The court granted the Attorney General’s application. The respondent had instituted vexatious proceedings and made vexatious applications. Applying the objective approach in Attorney-General v Barker, the court considered the lack of merit, repeated attempts to relitigate concluded issues, the burdens imposed on the Trust and the Nursing and Midwifery Council, and the resulting drain on court resources. An honest belief in injustice did not alter that conclusion.
4. The proceedings had been instituted habitually or persistently. The relevant conduct included repetitive claims and appeals, refusal to accept final decisions, and continuing attempts to challenge earlier restraint-order decisions. The requirement that proceedings have been brought in the High Court or an inferior court, including the Employment Tribunal, was also satisfied.
5. Article 6. Following Attorney General v Covey, the court held that the order did not remove the essence of the respondent’s right of access to court. She remained able to seek leave to bring justified proceedings. The restriction pursued the legitimate aim of protecting litigants and the administration of justice and was proportionate.
6. A civil proceedings order was made. The court refused to set aside its decisions or stay the proceedings after circulation of the draft judgment.