Tom Delaney & Anor v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor

At permission stage under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, an inspector may fairly refuse late oral evidence where the appellant supplied no witness statement or advance detail and admission would deprive other parties of a proper opportunity to respond. A contemporaneous explanation need not be repeated in the decision letter if the basis of the refusal remains clear. Permission should be granted where it is sufficiently arguable that the inspector failed to engage with evidence relevant to implementation of a retrospectively described permission, or that later enforcement action was broader than the earlier action relied on under the second-bite provision. An unaccompanied site visit is not unlawful merely because it is unaccompanied when observations are fairly put to the parties.

The applicants, owners of separate areas at Moate Farm, sought permission under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to challenge an Inspector’s 15 December 2025 decision on two enforcement appeals. Appeal A concerned excess caravans in breach of a planning condition. Appeal C alleged an unauthorised material change of use on the basis that a 2015 permission had lapsed. The Inspector dismissed Appeals A, C and D and quashed the notices in Appeals B and E. The court considered late oral evidence, implementation of the 2015 permission, the second-bite provision, and an unaccompanied site visit. Permission was granted on Grounds 2 and 3, but refused on Ground 1, Ground 4 and the remaining grounds.

Disposition. Permission to appeal was granted on Grounds 2 and 3, both concerning Appeal C. Permission was refused on Ground 1, Ground 4 and the remaining grounds. The substantive appeal remained for case management.

1. Late oral evidence. Under the Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Hearings Procedure) Rules 2002, the Inspector had a broad procedural discretion. Refusal of Peter Delaney’s unannounced request to give evidence was fair and not irrational because no witness statement or adequate advance detail had been supplied, the other parties could not properly prepare or cross-examine him, and written evidence remained available. The later adjournment gave the applicants an opportunity to renew the request, which they did not use. The failure to repeat the contemporaneous reasons in the Decision Letter was not fatal.
2. Implementation of the 2015 permission. The Inspector had relied on the three-year commencement condition and an unfulfilled pre-commencement landscaping condition in concluding that the permission had not been implemented. It was sufficiently arguable that he had failed to engage with evidence in the officer report that the bund and hardstanding existed and that two caravans were on the site, together with the planning consultant’s account of occupation. The court expressed no concluded view on implementation.
3. Second bite provision. It was sufficiently arguable that the later Area B enforcement notice did not concern the same breach as the 2021 notice. The earlier notice addressed 37 additional caravans, whereas the later notice alleged a material change of use of the whole area after the 2015 permission had lapsed. It was also arguable that the Inspector had failed to address evidence that caravans were present before 2016 when applying the alternative ten-year period beginning on 7 December 2014.
4. Site visit and remaining grounds. The unaccompanied site visit did not disclose an arguable error. The Inspector fairly put his observations to the applicants’ agent, did not treat the languages heard on site as necessarily inconsistent with gypsy or traveller occupation, and was entitled to reduce the weight given to unmet need in the absence of evidence about occupation beyond the applicants’ families. The Inspector’s reading of overlooked documents after an adjournment cured that complaint, and the bias allegation was unsubstantiated.

Counsel were invited to agree a draft order, including case management directions for the substantive appeal.

1. Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State: By Decision Letter dated 15 December 2025, the Inspector dismissed Appeals A, C and D and quashed the enforcement notices in Appeals B and E. The applicants sought permission under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 only in relation to Appeals A and C.
2. High Court (Planning Court): Permission was granted on Grounds 2 and 3 concerning Appeal C and refused on all other grounds. The substantive appeal remained to be case managed.