Segrue Investments Limited, R (on the application of) v Swindon Borough Council

The mandatory duty to issue a revised Community Infrastructure Levy liability notice is not triggered merely because late evidence may show that the original assessment misstated pre-existing facts. Nor does the discretionary power to issue a revised notice at any time impose a blanket duty to examine every late submission. Those powers must be read with the time-limited statutory review and appeal scheme. Evidence which could and should have been advanced through that scheme will ordinarily not require reconsideration. Judicial review cannot bypass that alternative remedy or restart time through correspondence which merely confirms an earlier decision. The claim was dismissed.

Segrue Investments Limited sought judicial review of Swindon Borough Council’s refusal to issue revised Community Infrastructure Levy liability notices concerning two residential developments at a former HSBC site. The Claimant relied on late evidence about continued use of the building, a Valuation Office Agency appeal decision, and regulations 65(4) and 65(5) of the 2010 Regulations. The Council argued that the statutory review and appeal deadlines had expired, that the 4 July 2025 email was not the operative decision, and that judicial review had a suitable alternative remedy. The central issues were whether regulation 65 required substantive consideration of the late evidence and whether the later correspondence created a fresh challengeable decision.

1. Disposition. The claim was dismissed on three independent bases: the Claimant had a suitable alternative remedy; the claim was out of time; and each ground failed on its merits. Permission to apply for judicial review was formally granted at the rolled-up hearing.
2. Statutory construction. The court applied the approach in Gardiner v Hertsmere Borough Council [2022] PTSR: the words of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 had to be given their ordinary meaning in their statutory context. The fiscal character of the scheme and its detailed, self-contained structure supported strict attention to the statutory language and certainty for developers and collecting authorities.
3. Regulation 65(4). The mandatory duty to issue a revised notice was not engaged whenever new evidence was submitted after the original notice and appeared to establish the pre-existing factual position. The phrase concerning a change arising on appeal or otherwise referred to formal changes recognised within the statutory scheme, such as a successful review, appeal, or subsequent change in relief or exemption. The Claimant’s interpretation would make the review and appeal provisions effectively otiose.
4. Regulation 65(5). The power to issue a revised notice at any time did not impose a blanket duty to substantively consider all evidence submitted after the review period. It could, in an appropriate case, temper the statutory scheme, including where genuinely unavailable and overtly cogent evidence emerged. Here, however, the relevant matters could and should have been advanced through the review and appeal procedures. The Council had also substantively considered material supplied after the deadline. The VOA decision was available before the deadline for the second notice, and the second CBRE letter was not shown to have been unavailable earlier. The decision therefore did not require further consideration under regulation 65(5).
5. Alternative remedy. The principles in Harley Development Inc v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1996] 1 WLR 727 and R (Oval Estates (St Peter’s) Ltd) v Bath and North East Somerset Council [2020] PTSR 861 applied. The regulation 114 appeal was generally a suitable remedy for a factual dispute about CIL liability, with regulation 113 review as its gateway. Judicial review was a remedy of last resort.
6. Delay. Applying R (Arnold White Estates Ltd) v Forestry Commission [2023] PTSR 242, correspondence which merely confirmed an earlier substantive decision could not restart time. The exception identified in R (Inclusion Housing Community Interest Co) v Regulator of Social Housing [2020] EWHC 346 (Admin) did not apply because the Council had not conducted a genuine internal review while holding back a final decision. The Council’s position was final by 2023, or at the latest when the VOA decision was supplied in November 2024. The July 2025 email merely confirmed that position.
7. The refusal to reconsider the late evidence was neither irrational nor inadequately reasoned. The expiry of the statutory review and appeal periods was an adequate explanation. The claim was therefore dismissed, with no extension of time having been sought.

not stated in the judgment.