Royal Holloway and Bedford New College v QLaw Legal Services Limited

A professional executor appointed by a will cannot charge the estate merely because the testator was told before death that professional executors would charge. Where the will contains no charging clause, remuneration under the Trustee Act 2000 requires written agreement by every other trustee or executor. Acquiescence, a request for a costs estimate, receipt of costs information, and implied agreement are insufficient. Contractual retainer principles do not replace that statutory requirement. The court left open any later application invoking its inherent jurisdiction.

The Claimant, a residuary beneficiary, applied under section 71(3) of the Solicitors Act 1974 for assessment of bills rendered by the Defendant for professional executor services. The will appointed the Defendant’s directors as executors but contained no charging clause. The court ordered assessment and directed the Defendant’s entitlement to remuneration to be determined as a preliminary issue. The central questions were whether pre-death communications, costs correspondence, or the co-executor’s conduct created a charging right or the written agreement required by section 29(2) of the Trustee Act 2000. The court did not determine any later application under its inherent jurisdiction.

The preliminary issue was determined against the Defendant. The court held that it had no right to charge Ms Selby’s estate for Mr Quantick’s professional executor services.

1. Statutory framework. Sections 28(5), 35(1) and 39(1) of the Trustee Act 2000 placed professional personal representatives within the statutory remuneration regime. Section 29(2) required written agreement by each other trustee before reasonable remuneration could be taken. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Shepherd & Co Solicitors v Brealey [2024] EWCA Civ 303 explained the policy against an automatic charging clause and the need for transparency and agreement.
2. No charging clause. The pre-death letter was concerned with assistance in preparing the will. At most, it showed that the testator may have been willing to make a will permitting professional charges. The executors were appointed by the will, not by the letter or the discussions to which it referred. Those communications therefore could not confer a charging right absent a provision in the will.
3. No written agreement. The co-executor’s de facto acquiescence, request for a costs estimate, and acknowledgement of costs information did not amount to written agreement under section 29(2). Reliance on an implied agreement would be inconsistent with the plain meaning and purpose of the provision. Contractual retainer principles were not determinative, and informed consent was not an additional statutory requirement.
4. Scope and next steps. The judgment decided only the Defendant’s entitlement to remuneration on the preliminary issue. It did not decide whether the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to permit remuneration. The Defendant could make a later application, potentially informed by assessment of the work actually done. If no such application was made, the proceedings could conclude with reimbursement only of out-of-pocket expenses. A directions hearing was to follow.

No appellate history is stated. The judgment records that the court had made an assessment order on 18 February 2026 and directed the remuneration issue to be tried as a preliminary issue.