MUF, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Defence

Under condition 1(iii) of the Immigration Rules Appendix ARAP 3.6, eligibility requires an objective, case-specific and holistic assessment. The decision-maker must consider the applicant’s substantive work, the institutions involved and their connections with the relevant UK department. Institutional support, training, shared objectives or judicial status alone do not establish the required relationship, although judicial independence is not an obstacle. Heightened scrutiny applies where refusal exposes the applicant to a real risk of death, torture or serious harm. The defendant rationally addressed most of the evidence but failed to decide whether reports attributed to the claimant or other judges had supported the wider UK prosecution system. That omission made the fourth review decision unlawful. It was quashed and remitted for a fresh decision.

The claimant, formerly a judge at Kabul’s Anti-Terrorism Court, sought judicial review of a fourth decision refusing relocation under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy for himself and his family. The refusal followed the quashing and remittal of an earlier review decision in R (ACG) v Secretary of State for Defence [2025] EWHC 2472 (Admin). The claimant challenged the interpretation of ARAP condition 1(iii), distinctions drawn between Afghan judges, the assessment of evidence, procedural fairness and compliance with the earlier judgment. On the rolled-up hearing, permission was refused on grounds 1, 4 and 5; permission was granted but the claim was dismissed on ground 2; and permission was granted and the claim allowed on ground 3. The central issue was whether the defendant had lawfully assessed the claimant’s individual work and the institutional links between the Anti-Terrorism Court and the FCDO.

1. Disposition. Permission was refused on grounds 1, 4 and 5. Permission was granted but the claim was dismissed on ground 2. Permission was granted and the claim was allowed on ground 3. The fourth review refusal dated 9 February 2026 was declared unlawful, quashed and remitted for a fresh review decision within six weeks, subject to the stated appeal timetable.
2. Construction of ARAP condition 1(iii). The Immigration Rules required an objective construction according to ordinary and natural meaning. Following Mahad (Ethiopia) v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16 and R (LND1 and ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and anor [2024] EWCA Civ 278, the assessment had to be case-specific and holistic. It required consideration of the substance of the applicant’s work, the institutions in which it was performed and their connections with the relevant UK department. An institutional relationship alone was insufficient. Funding, training, logistical assistance, shared objectives and judicial status did not, without more, establish the required relationship. Judicial independence was not an obstacle, but judging terrorism cases was not itself enough.
3. Rationality and scrutiny. Rationality review covered both the reasoning process and the outcome. Given the evidence of a real risk of death, torture or serious harm, heightened scrutiny applied. The court had to examine the decision-making process rigorously and the reasons had to show that material factors favouring the claimant had been considered. Earlier evacuation decisions could rationally be distinguished because the eligibility criteria had differed and had been stretched during the emergency response.
4. Ground 3. The post-decision evidence from Ms Ferguson was admissible because it elucidated and confirmed the contemporaneous reasoning rather than contradicting or reframing it. However, the evidence about reports allegedly provided by ATC judges to British officials remained unresolved. The defendant’s decision did not explain whether the claimant or other judges had supplied reports, whether those reports might have been communicated through court directors, or whether they supported the effective end-to-end prosecution system the FCDO was seeking to establish. That omission breached the requirement for a holistic assessment under heightened scrutiny and rendered the decision unlawful.
5. Earlier judgment. The ratio of the earlier judicial review judgment had to be treated as binding on reconsideration, but it did not require the defendant to reach a favourable outcome. The fourth review decision had expressly considered that judgment and was not unlawful merely because it again refused the application.

This was a first-instance judicial review. The judgment records that the claimant’s earlier second review decision was quashed and remitted by the High Court in [2025] EWHC 2472 (Admin) ; a third review decision was then withdrawn and replaced by the fourth decision challenged here. This court declared the fourth decision unlawful, quashed it and remitted the application for reconsideration.