David Harris & Anor v Peninsula Finance PLC

A party should ordinarily raise at the first interlocutory hearing the arguments reasonably available to support the relief sought. A repeat application for the same or similar relief may be an abuse of process where it relies on points that could have been raised earlier, unless circumstances have changed significantly and materially or the applicant relies on facts that were unknown and could not reasonably have been discovered. A later-issued claim form or fuller evidence does not alone meet that exception. Applying the Court of Appeal’s approach in Koza Ltd v Koza Altin AS [2021] 1 WLR 170, the court refused the renewed injunction.

The claimants sought an interim injunction restraining Peninsula Finance from exercising its rights as chargee over two properties. Their substantive claim concerns a staged development finance facility, the defendant’s conduct concerning funding and security, and relief including relief under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

In December 2025, HHJ Blohm KC dismissed an almost identical pre-action injunction application. The defendant had undertaken not to enforce until the earlier of the Financial Ombudsman complaint being resolved or 28 February 2026. The ombudsman issued a decision in May 2026, but the claimants did not accept it, so the defendant was not obliged to implement it. The claimants later issued their claim and sought substantially the same interim relief. The central issue was whether the renewed application was an abuse of process.

1. Application refused. The court refused the interim injunction as an abuse of process. The earlier application had sought almost exactly the same relief and had been dismissed without an appeal. The relevant question was whether anything material had changed since then ([11], [14], [17]).
2. The Henderson and Hunter principles apply to interlocutory hearings. As explained in Koza Ltd v Koza Altin AS [2021] 1 WLR 170, a party should generally raise at the first opportunity points reasonably available to it. A later application for the same or similar relief may be abusive if it advances points that could have been raised earlier, absent a significant and material change of circumstances or facts that were unknown and could not reasonably have been discovered at the first hearing. There is no general indulgence for interlocutory applications; serial applications may harass the other party and undermine finality ([11]-[12]).
3. The claimants had not shown the required change. They could have issued their claim before the first application, the threats to enforce were materially the same, and the additional information and evidence did not make this a different situation. Because the claimants had rejected the ombudsman’s decision, the defendant was not bound to implement it; the judge put it aside for present purposes ([10], [13]-[14]).
4. The judge accepted that there was a serious issue to be tried, including as to unfairness of the relationship and the applicability of the Consumer Credit Act. The judge did not decide whether damages were an adequate remedy. The judge provisionally considered that they might be adequate because the development was intended as a rental venture rather than for immediate occupation ([15]-[16]).
5. Costs. The defendant had succeeded on the injunction application. The claimants’ frustration and the possibility that they might succeed in the substantive claim did not justify making costs costs in the case. The claimants were ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed ([18]-[19]).

This was a first-instance decision, not an appeal. The court records that HHJ Blohm KC dismissed an earlier pre-action injunction application on 19 December 2025; no appeal was brought. A later application to vary the costs order was refused by DJ Wales on 17 February 2026.