Shahira Sadat & Ors, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration Rules made under the Immigration Act 1971 are administrative rules, not primary legislation, and mandatory wording does not remove the Secretary of State's residual power to grant leave outside the Rules.

The non-fettering principle is substantive: a policy may be unqualified, but the decision-maker must remain willing to consider an exceptional case or new matter. A court should scrutinise the process rigorously where interests are serious, while allowing a wide margin for policy-laden, predictive immigration outcomes. A mismatched comparison of visas and visa-linked asylum claims can rationally indicate future risk when its limitations and context are recognised. Common-law equality principles do not make an inward-facing visa restriction irrational merely because it affects women facing educational inequality abroad.

Seven prospective students brought conjoined, rolled-up judicial review claims against the Student Visa Brake introduced by Statement of Changes HC 1691. Appendix Student ST 3.3 made nationals of Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan ineligible to obtain student entry clearance.

• The Farah claimants challenged the decision-making process, including reliance on the Conversion Rate, the investigation of visa misuse, the consideration of alternatives, and alleged fettering of the discretion to grant leave outside the Rules.
• The Sadat claimants challenged the Student Guidance, alleged fettering, and the failure to consider the differential impact on women and girls in the affected countries.

The central issues were whether the decision and its implementation were irrational, procedurally defective, unlawfully discriminatory, or inconsistent with the residual discretion to grant leave outside the Rules.

The court granted permission on every ground except Farah ground 3 and Sadat ground 5, but dismissed both claims.

1. Intensity of review. The serious consequences for affected students justified heightened scrutiny of the decision-making process. However, the measure was policy-laden, predictive and concerned with immigration control and the public interest. The Secretary of State therefore enjoyed a wide margin when the rationality of the outcome was challenged. This approach was consistent with R (Hoareau) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2020] EWCA Civ 1010 and R (KP) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2025] EWHC 370 (Admin).
2. Farah grounds 1 to 3. The Conversion Rate compared student visas issued with later visa-linked asylum claims and was not an exact matched conversion rate. Its limitations were recognised, and the five-year data, time-lag information and country circumstances made it a rational indicator of the balance between visas and future asylum claims. The Secretary of State was not required to prove historical visa abuse. She had considered other measures, and targeting particular courses was operationally complex and susceptible to circumvention. Farah ground 3 was refused permission; grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed on their merits.
3. Fettering. Under the Immigration Act 1971, the Secretary of State retained a broad residual discretion to grant leave outside the Immigration Rules. Mandatory Rules were not themselves subject to the non-fettering principle, but the residual discretion was. The Student Guidance directed caseworkers on applications under the Rules and did not purport to extinguish or confine the residual discretion. General statements that applications under the Rules would be refused did not establish that a properly made application for leave outside the Rules would not be considered. The absence of formal applications or refusal decisions was significant. The application process was not practically impossible merely because a Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies was unavailable, fees were payable, or the route was not expressly signposted.
4. Discrimination. The public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010 had no extraterritorial effect, although ordinary public-law equality principles could remain relevant. The Visa Brake was an inward-facing immigration and border-control measure. The Secretary of State was not irrationally obliged to treat gender inequalities abroad as mandatory considerations or to create a gender-specific exception. The discrimination grounds were therefore dismissed.

The claims were dismissed in their entirety.