F v M (Disclosure to the First Tier Tribunal)

Disclosure of a fact-finding judgment from private family proceedings under Family Procedure Rules 2010, rule 12.73(1)(b), requires a fact-sensitive balancing exercise. There is no presumption for or against disclosure. The court must decide whether disclosure is necessary and proportionate, considering welfare, confidentiality, the public interest in the administration of justice and cooperation between public bodies. Family findings may be relevant to asylum proceedings despite a different standard of proof. The specialist tribunal must make its own assessment and decide what weight to give them. A party may seek disclosure without a prior request from the tribunal where the balance favours disclosure.

This was a first-instance application in Article 21 access proceedings concerning D, an eight-year-old child. The mother and D were appealing refusal of asylum in England. The asylum case relied partly on allegations that the father belonged to a powerful group and that D had been sexually abused in his care. After a five-day fact-finding hearing, the court rejected those allegations: F v M and anor [2026] EWHC 239 (Fam). The father, supported by D’s guardian, sought permission under Family Procedure Rules 2010, rule 12.73(1)(b), to disclose the fact-finding judgment and schedule of findings to the First Tier Tribunal, the Home Office and UK Visas and Immigration. The mother opposed disclosure. The central question was whether disclosure was necessary and proportionate after balancing the relevant factors.

1. Application granted. The court directed the father’s solicitors to provide the fact-finding judgment, the schedule of findings and the present judgment to the First Tier Tribunal, the Home Office and UK Visas and Immigration.
2. The court applied the disclosure framework in Re C (A Minor)(Care Proceedings Disclosure) sub nom Re EC (Disclosure of Material) [1996] 2 FLR 725. The discretion under rule 12.73(1)(b) requires a balancing exercise. There is no presumption for or against disclosure. Disclosure must be necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances.
3. The family court and immigration authorities perform different functions and apply different standards of proof. That did not make the family findings irrelevant. The allegations substantially overlapped, had been examined during a five-day fact-finding hearing and were therefore plainly capable of relevance to the asylum claims. The First Tier Tribunal remained an independent specialist tribunal, responsible for conducting its own assessment and deciding what weight, if any, to give the findings.
4. Child welfare was an important factor but was not paramount. Disclosure created risks, including anxiety and possible immigration consequences, while non-disclosure also carried welfare risks because of the continuing false narrative about sexual abuse. The welfare factors were finely balanced. An expert opinion which had not been tested in court did not provide a sufficient basis for finding that asylum granted on an inaccurate factual basis would itself harm D.
5. The greatest weight lay in the public interest in informed judicial decision-making and cooperation between public bodies. The mother’s solicitors’ letter had left the Tribunal with an incomplete and potentially misleading account of the family proceedings, without the court making any finding about their intention. The authorities, including Re G (Disclosure of Fact-finding Judgment to the Secretary of State for the Home Department) [2023] EWHC 450 and R v G and H [2022] EWHC 367 (Fam), supported the importance of communication across the justice system. The Protocol permitted a party to initiate a request. The absence of a request from the Tribunal did not prevent disclosure, and the receiving authorities would decide what use to make of the material.
6. Confidentiality would be only minimally affected because substantial disclosure had already occurred. The remaining Re C factors carried little or no weight. The balance therefore favoured disclosure, which was both necessary and proportionate.

High Court (Family Division): The court had earlier determined the fact-finding issues in F v M and anor [2026] EWHC 239 (Fam) . The present disclosure application was then determined at first instance, with disclosure ordered.