Secretary of State for Justice v Glyn Razzell

On a statutory referral of a Parole Board release decision, the High Court must decide for itself whether continued confinement remains necessary for public protection. The release test requires positive satisfaction that the risk of further serious harm is no more than minimal; it is not a balance between risk and tariff expiry. Denial of guilt and non-disclosure under section 28A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 are not automatic bars or punishment, but may be powerful evidence about insight, empathy, honesty, treatment engagement and the reliability of supervision. A plan dependent on candour, disclosure and future risk-reduction work cannot establish public safety where those matters remain seriously doubtful. Past compliance and professional support remain relevant, but must be assessed against the whole risk evidence.

This was the first substantive referral under section 32ZAA of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. Glyn Razzell, serving a life sentence for murdering his wife, maintained his innocence and refused to disclose the location of her remains. The evidence also included findings of intimate partner violence, limited offence-focused risk-reduction work and continuing concerns about insight and honesty.

After hearings in January 2026, the Parole Board directed his release on licence, relying on his long compliance in open conditions, extensive temporary release, professional support and a proposed risk-management plan. The Secretary of State referred the decision to the High Court, contending that the risk remained more than minimal and that the plan depended on unreliable self-reporting, future rehabilitation and disclosure of relationships. The central issue was whether the High Court could itself be satisfied that continued confinement was no longer necessary for public protection.

The High Court quashed the Parole Board’s direction to release. The statutory referral required an independent determination under the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. It was neither an appeal nor judicial review of the Board’s reasoning, although the Board’s decision, reasoning and evidential material were highly relevant. The court also confirmed that an oral hearing was ordinarily appropriate in a liberty-related referral where evidence, credibility and participation might matter, consistently with Osborn (Appellant) v The Parole Board (Respondent); Booth (Appellant) v The Parole Board (Respondent) [2013] UKSC 61.

1. Applicable test. The court had to be positively satisfied that there was no more than a minimal risk of further offending causing serious harm. The test was not a balancing exercise and did not weigh tariff expiry or punishment against risk: R (King) v The Parole Board [2016] EWCA Civ 51. If risk remained more than minimal, could not be adequately assessed, or could not be sufficiently managed by the proposed controls, the release direction had to be quashed.
2. Evidence. The court independently assessed the unproven allegations. It was not bound by the Board’s factual findings and, applying the structured approach associated with R. (on the application of Pearce) v. The Parole Board of England and Wales [2023] AC 807, found one disputed allegation proved on the balance of probabilities. The wider history of intimate partner violence provided context for the murder and demonstrated a continuing propensity to violence against women.
3. Denial and non-disclosure. Helen’s Law created no automatic no-body, no-parole rule. Consistently with R v The Parole Board, ex parte Oyston [2000] EWCA3552, denial was not treated as independently disqualifying. Here, however, continued denial and non-disclosure materially impaired insight, empathy, honesty and meaningful risk formulation. The plan depended on candour, disclosure of relationships and engagement with supervision, while the evidence showed persistent deception, narrative control, incomplete risk-reduction work and warning signs that might not be observable without self-reporting.
4. Conclusion. Long compliance in open conditions, professional support and intensive proposed controls were relevant but conditional. They did not provide a secure basis for finding that the relationship-based risk had fallen to a minimal level. The court was not satisfied that confinement was no longer necessary and ordered that the Parole Board’s release direction be quashed. The judgment identified structured offence-related work, genuine and testable insight, identifiable warning signs, openness adverse to the prisoner’s interests and stronger internal controls as matters required in any future application.

This was a statutory referral, not an appeal or judicial review. The Parole Board directed release on 12 April 2026 after hearings on 19 and 29 January 2026. The Secretary of State referred the decision under section 32ZAA of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. The High Court independently applied section 32ZAC and quashed the direction.