TWG v The Scout Association

For a civil personal-injury claim attributable to child sexual abuse, sections 11ZA and 11ZB of the Limitation Act 1980 remove the former limitation regime for claims within their scope. The claim must be dismissed only where the defendant satisfies the court that a fair hearing is impossible.

Stage 2 of vicarious liability asks whether wrongdoing is sufficiently closely connected with acts entrusted to the tortfeasor to be regarded as occurring in the course of employment or quasi-employment. Mere but-for causation or opportunity is insufficient. Authority, trust, responsibility, access and misuse of an entrusted relationship may establish the connection. Off-site timing is not decisive.

The claimant sought damages for repeated sexual assaults committed when he was aged 10 by an assistant Cub Scout leader at a group operated by the defendant. The claim was pleaded solely on vicarious liability. The defendant admitted the abuse only to the extent of the assault reflected in the leader’s criminal proceedings and raised limitation.

The trial concerned the extent of the assaults, whether the leader’s role was sufficiently closely connected with them, psychiatric causation and damages. After the evidence and submissions, section 96 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 inserted sections 11ZA and 11ZB into the Limitation Act 1980. The parties accepted that the claim fell within the new regime and the defendant did not contend that a fair hearing was impossible. The central substantive issue was whether stage 2 of the vicarious liability test was satisfied.

Judgment was entered for the claimant. The defendant was vicariously liable and the claimant was awarded £95,500, with interest to be calculated and agreed.

1. Limitation. Section 96 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 inserted sections 11ZA and 11ZB into the Limitation Act 1980. Section 11ZA applied to the claim. Under section 11ZB(2), dismissal was required only if the defendant satisfied the court that a fair hearing was impossible. The defendant accepted that the issues could be fairly tried. The claim was therefore not barred, and it was unnecessary to determine the former section 33 discretion.
2. Vicarious liability. The court applied the two-stage approach reflected in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, Various Claimants v Morrison Supermarkets plc [2020] UKSC 12 and Trustees of the Barry Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v BXB [2023] UKSC 15. The relationship stage was common ground. Stage 2 required a fact-sensitive legal assessment of whether the assaults were so closely connected with authorised or entrusted activities that they could fairly and properly be regarded as occurring in the course of quasi-employment. Mere opportunity or but-for causation was insufficient.
3. In child sexual abuse cases, authority, responsibility, trust, access and the misuse of an entrusted relationship are particularly important. The fact that abuse occurred away from the defendant’s premises or outside formal hours was not decisive. The reasoning in London Borough of Haringey v FZO [2020] EWCA Civ 180 and X v London Borough of Wandsworth [2006] EWCA Civ 535 supported that approach. Grubb knew the claimant through his role, exercised authority over him, acquired his trust and knowledge of his movements, and repeatedly exploited that relationship. The assaults were therefore a misuse of the position entrusted to him.
4. The failure to call Grubb did not justify an adverse inference. Any conclusion about his availability, co-operation or reliability would have been speculative, and the evidence available was sufficient. The court accepted the diagnosis of PTSD and recurrent depressive disorder caused by the abuse. General damages were £80,000, aggravated damages £10,000, treatment costs £5,000 and travel expenses £500.