Molik Shahriar Ahmed & Anor v Mirja Mohammed Zafar Uddin & Ors

For charity proceedings under the Charities Act 2011, a legally sustainable claim is necessary but does not by itself justify permission. The High Court exercises its own jurisdiction, giving appropriate weight to the Charity Commission’s expertise, and asks whether litigation is the best or least worst course for the charity as a whole. Permission may be refused where the proposed litigation is likely to impose unaffordable costs or deplete charitable funds and the claimed wider benefit is unproven. Curable defects in pleading or joinder do not necessarily defeat an otherwise viable claim. A missed procedural time limit may be extended after expiry, but unexplained delay and inefficient procedural conduct may justify refusal. Here permission was refused on charity-interest and financial grounds.

The claimants were members and former officers of TVICA, an unincorporated charity operating a mosque. After an altercation, they were suspended and later expelled. They sought permission to bring charity proceedings challenging the decisions under the constitution and alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, with injunctive and declaratory relief.

The Charity Commission refused authorisation under section 115(2) of the Charities Act 2011. The claimants applied to the High Court under section 115(5), outside the 21-day period, following earlier misfiled, struck-out and procedurally defective applications. The issues were whether the proposed claims were legally sustainable and properly presented, whether litigation served the charity’s interests given its finances, and whether time should be extended.

The application for permission was refused and the claim was dismissed. The defendants were awarded their costs, to be summarily assessed if not agreed.

1. Applicable approach. The court applied the principles in Rai v Charity Commissioner of England and Wales [2012] EWHC 1111 (Ch), as summarised in Hussain v Chowdhury [2020] EWHC 790. A section 115(5) application is an exercise of the High Court’s own jurisdiction, not an appeal from the Charity Commission. The Commission’s decision is relevant and merits appropriate respect because of its expertise. A legally sustainable claim is necessary, but is not sufficient. The permission hearing is not ordinarily a rehearsal of the final trial.
2. Structured inquiry. The court identified the dispute, considered standing and legal sustainability, assessed pleading and party defects, considered the financial impact of litigation, and asked whether proceedings were the best or least worst course in the interests of the charity as a whole.
3. Application. The claimants had standing and a viable potential claim. Joinder and pleading defects could be cured by amendment or representation orders. The likely proceedings would require at least a four- to five-day trial and could generate substantial costs. The charity had limited liquid resources and could not safely fund the defence or possible indemnity exposure. There was no convincing evidence of a wider benefit to the charity. Changed governance, the absence of widespread ongoing dissatisfaction and the informal survey supported refusal. The court would, in any event, have confined permission to the current termination of membership rather than the historic suspension.
4. Time. The court recognised that Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 would be relevant only if the missed period carried an express or implied sanction. Under rule 3.1(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, an extension could be granted after expiry. If permission had otherwise been appropriate, the unexplained delays, defective procedural course, use of court resources and passage of more than three years would have justified refusing an extension.

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment. It records earlier procedural applications in 2024 and 2025, including strike-out orders and refusal of relief from sanctions.