R v Robert Webb

For criminal legal aid remuneration, whether a later hearing is a new trial is a fact-specific question. A formal order is not essential, but the transcript must show an unequivocal order or plainly expressed intention to order a new trial. The court must assess cumulatively whether there was a sufficient break in the trial matrix, including the stage reached, elapsed time, changes in participants or the case, preparation, evidence, jury presentation, forensic structure and judicial comments.

A short interval, no empanelled jury, a co-defendant’s guilty plea, a reduced estimate or an amended jury bundle will not, without concrete evidence of material change, establish a new trial. The later hearing remained part of one continuous trial for fee purposes.

Mr David Lyons appealed against a redetermination of criminal legal aid remuneration. Mr Robert Webb and two co-defendants were due to face a five- to six-week Crown Court conspiracy trial. On the second day, Mr Dennard pleaded guilty to one count and the other count was left on file. The trial of Mr Webb and the remaining defendant was adjourned to 2 June 2025 and continued for 10 days.

The appeal concerned whether the events of 19–20 May and 2–16 June constituted a trial followed by a new trial, attracting separate fees, or one continuous trial fee under Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013. The central issues were whether the trial judge had ordered a new trial and whether the later hearing was a new trial in substance.

The appeal was dismissed. The court held that the two hearing periods did not justify payment as a trial and a new trial. There was no order as to costs.

1. The claim was governed by the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013. The absence of a formal new-trial order was not fatal. The question was whether the trial judge’s words, read in context, amounted to an unequivocal order or plainly expressed intention. Under R v Spahiu [2026] EWHC 276 (SCCO), an unequivocal order would engage the Regulations. R v Ojapah SCCO Ref SC-2019-CRI-000062 showed that a recorded comment may be treated as a ruling where the intention is plain, but the intention here was not plain.
2. Whether a later hearing is a new trial in substance is fact-specific and requires a cumulative assessment. Following the approach in R v Lock [2024] EWHC 1324 (SCCO), the court considered the time between hearings, stage reached, relative length, changes of advocate or judge, changes in the case, judicial comments, and any material change in scale, preparation, evidential focus, jury presentation or forensic structure. R v Sandel [2025] EWHC 991 (SCCO) was treated as reflecting the fact-specific nature of the inquiry.
3. A short interval and absence of an empanelled jury are relevant but not determinative, consistently with R v George [2023] EWHC 2187 (SCCO). A reduced estimate and amended jury bundle do not establish a new trial without evidence of material change. A changed co-defendant composition may be indicative when coupled with materially changed evidence or trial presentation, as explained in R v Curtis Howarth [2024] EWHC 310 (SCCO), but the appellant identified no concrete additional preparation or material reconfiguration.
4. The gap of about two weeks fell within the period contemplated by the Regulations for a new trial beginning within one month, so it could not itself show that there was only one trial. The absence of a change of Mr Webb’s counsel or judge supplied no cumulative support. The transcript showed an adjournment arranged to avoid a break caused by the judge’s leave and to hear the shortened trial through. It did not show a new-trial order or a sufficient break in the trial matrix. The later hearing was therefore a continuation of the original trial.

1. High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) The appeal against redetermination was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
2. Determining Officer Written reasons dated 2 September 2025 were relied on in the appeal. No citation for the redetermination is stated.