R v Spriddell

A defendant’s costs order is subject to the prescribed regulatory scheme. Routine communications are classified by the time they take, not by the complexity of the underlying prosecution. Items recorded at six minutes or less are routine, even in an exceptionally complex case. Where enhancement criteria are met, routine communications may receive the same enhancement as preparation time. Counsel’s reasonable remuneration is assessed by reference to Legal Aid rates rather than private-market fees.

The appellant was acquitted in the Crown Court and obtained a defendant’s costs order covering investigation, magistrates’ court and Crown Court proceedings. The Legal Aid Agency determining officer assessed the recoverable costs. The appellant appealed under regulation 10 of the Costs in Criminal Cases (General) Regulations 1986, challenging the treatment of routine communications and the fees allowed for trial counsel.

The central issues were whether routine Crown Court items could attract enhancement and whether the determining officer had allowed reasonable remuneration for counsel in an unusually complex and lengthy fraud trial.

1. The appeal concerning magistrates’ court costs failed because the 1986 Regulations provide no redetermination or appeal from the determining officer’s decision on those costs.
2. For Crown Court costs, whether a letter, email or telephone call is routine depends on the time it takes or should take, not on the complexity of the underlying case. An item recorded at six minutes or less is routine.
3. Where conducting solicitors accept substantial responsibility in a complex case and the criteria for enhancement are present, routine communications form part of the overall work and may receive the same enhancement as preparation time. The appellant was fairly permitted to raise that ground on the appeal, and the routine Crown Court items were allowed the same enhancement as preparation time.
4. Reasonable remuneration for counsel is assessed by reference to Legal Aid rates under the published rates and scales. Agreed fees, private-market rates and unrestricted comparators do not determine the sum payable from central funds. The court left open certain questions concerning the use of VHCC and Interim Fixed Fee Offer comparators.
5. The determining officer’s methodology for counsel’s fees was inexact but pragmatic and sensible. It produced reasonable remuneration by reference to Legal Aid rates. The counsel-fee challenge was dismissed. The appeal succeeded only to the limited extent relating to enhancement of routine Crown Court items, with the £100 appeal fee added and no further appeal costs awarded.

Appeal under regulation 10 of the Costs in Criminal Cases (General) Regulations 1986 from the Legal Aid Agency determining officer’s redetermination of Crown Court costs. The appeal was allowed in part.