Janet Simon, R (on the application of) v The Commissioner of The Police Metropolis

A restriction under Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 must satisfy the statutory threshold and remain proportionate to the Convention rights engaged. Where peaceful protest is restricted because of counter-protesters, careful scrutiny and reasonable facilitation remain required. However, the police may consider the practical interaction between opposing groups and cumulative disruption to community life, even where responsibility for individual incidents is disputed. Courts should give weight to experienced operational policing judgments and should not substitute their own view on the merits. A breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty is not established merely because no standalone assessment exists; the substance of due regard is decisive. Different conditions for protesters and counter-protesters do not, without more, establish discrimination.

This was a renewed application for permission to seek judicial review of a condition imposed under Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 on 7 May 2025. The condition prevented demonstrations by IJAN-UK within a specified area of Swiss Cottage.

The claimant argued that the restriction disproportionately interfered with political and religious expression, relied unlawfully on disruption caused by counter-protesters, discriminated against anti-Zionist Jewish protesters and breached Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The defendant relied on cumulative disruption, public order risks and the operational judgment of senior officers. Permission had previously been refused on the papers. The central question was whether any proposed ground disclosed an arguable public law error with a realistic prospect of success.

Permission refused. The renewed application did not disclose an arguable public law error with a realistic prospect of success.

1. Permission threshold. The court was not determining finally whether the claimant’s Convention rights had been infringed. It had to decide whether the proposed grounds were realistically arguable. A challenge which amounted only to disagreement with a lawful decision-maker’s evaluative judgment could not justify a substantive judicial review hearing.
2. Statutory and Convention framework. Section 14(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 required a senior officer reasonably to believe that an assembly might result in serious disruption, among other specified harms. The threshold of serious disruption was relatively high, and any conditions had to appear necessary to prevent the relevant harm. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 required the power to be exercised compatibly with Articles 9, 10 and 11. Those rights attracted a high level of protection but were qualified rights.
3. Proportionality. The court applied the four-stage test identified in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth & Development Affairs [2025] UKSC 30 at [118]: sufficient importance of the objective, rational connection, no equally effective less intrusive measure, and a fair balance between individual rights and community interests. The inquiry was fact-sensitive.
4. Counter-protesters and operational judgment. Restrictions imposed because of others’ conduct required careful scrutiny, and the police had positive obligations to facilitate peaceful protest. That did not make counter-protester disruption irrelevant. The police could consider the practical interaction between rival groups, the cumulative effect of recurring events and the consequences for the wider community, even if responsibility for particular incidents was disputed. The evidence showed that the location and message of the protest had been recognised, alternative arrangements had been used and the restrictions had evolved over time. The challenge therefore sought to substitute a different view of an operational policing judgment.
5. Discrimination. The decision documents recognised that the claimant and other participants were exercising protected religious, expressive and assembly rights. The different position of counter-protesters, whose location and operational circumstances depended on the underlying protest, provided an obvious distinction. Different conditions did not, without more, establish unequal treatment or discrimination.
6. Public Sector Equality Duty. Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 did not require a standalone assessment document. The issue was whether due regard had been paid in substance. The materials showed awareness of Jewish identity, anti-Zionist beliefs and the significance of the protest. The overlap between those considerations and the proportionality analysis did not disclose an arguable breach.
7. All three grounds were therefore refused permission.

This was a first-instance renewed permission application, not an appeal.

• Administrative Court, on the papers: Permission was refused by DHCJ Alan Bates on 29 June 2026.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The renewed oral application was heard on 20 August 2026. Permission was refused.