H v I

A disclosure order under POCA need not name a particular appropriate officer or confine its powers to a defined class beyond the statutory definition. It is an umbrella order. The order need only indicate the nature of the civil recovery investigation, not define it with high specificity or limit it to property held by the respondent. The application must satisfy section 357 and the requirements in section 358.

The breadth of the order does not, without more, make the interference with article 8 rights under the European Convention disproportionate where procedural safeguards are available. A respondent cannot generally challenge the relevance of individual requests in advance. The officer’s statutory judgment that information is relevant governs, subject to a reasonable excuse for non-compliance and later legal challenges.

The respondent applied to discharge a disclosure order made by Ellenbogen J on 12 August 2025 and two disclosure notices issued under it. An application for interim relief fell away by agreement. An unopposed anonymity application was granted.

The respondent argued that the order did not identify an appropriate officer, failed to comply with section 357(3)(b), lacked sufficient particularity, and disproportionately interfered with article 8 rights. A separate issue was whether the respondent could challenge the relevance of particular questions or requests before complying. The court had to determine the scope of the civil recovery investigation, the form and breadth of the disclosure order, and the proper procedure for contesting a disclosure notice.

The respondent’s application to discharge the disclosure order and the two notices failed. The anonymity order was granted, and the interim-relief application had fallen away by agreement.

1. Appropriate officer. Sections 357(4) and 378 of POCA do not require a named officer or a class narrower than the statutory category. Once made, the order authorises any appropriate officer to exercise the powers. The codes and Home Office circular had no statutory force, but were relevant context. Perry supported the same understanding.
2. Content and scope. Section 357(3)(b) governs the application, not the order. The application must identify specified person or property as subject to a civil recovery investigation and state that the order is sought for that purpose. Section 357(4) prescribes no particular form, and the section 358 requirements had been met. Under section 341, the investigation is directed to identifying recoverable or associated property, including its holders, extent and whereabouts. It is an in rem process that may involve innocent third parties. The order therefore need only indicate the nature of the investigation. It need not define it with high specificity or confine it to the respondent’s property. Perry and Simkus supported that conclusion.
3. Article 8. Although a disclosure order may significantly interfere with rights under article 8 of the European Convention, that interference is not disproportionate merely because the order confers wide powers. Safeguards included prior judicial supervision, applications to vary, set aside or discharge the order with access to the supporting material, judicial review of the officer’s discretion, and later testing of the evidence in civil recovery proceedings. Third parties must not second-guess the scope of requests. They must comply or seek variation.
4. Disclosure notices. A respondent has no a priori entitlement to challenge the relevance of an individual question or request. The appropriate officer has a wide discretion, and the statutory requirement is that the officer considers the information relevant. The recipient has an obligation to comply, although refusal may be justified by a reasonable excuse and may otherwise lead to criminal proceedings or contempt. The NCA is not obliged to explain relevance in advance. A good-faith challenge may be brought before the court, and relevance may be considered if refusal leads to further action. The judge left open whether a reasonable belief that a request was irrelevant could itself amount to a reasonable excuse.

No ground for discharging the order or notices was established. The substantive application was dismissed.

High Court (Administrative Court): The respondent applied to discharge a disclosure order made by Ellenbogen J on 12 August 2025 and two notices issued under it. The interim-relief application fell away by agreement. The application was dismissed.