MO v FO

An FGM protection order under the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 is an evidence-based protective remedy. The applicant must prove the alleged risk on the balance of probabilities. The court must assess the whole canvas, including the degree of risk, protective factors, family history and attitudes, and any interference with family life. An order should not be made merely because the adults agree that FGM should not occur. Where the evidence does not establish a real risk and the family would protect the child, the statutory power should not be exercised and interim orders should be discharged.

The mother applied under Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 for protection of her two-year-old daughter from an alleged risk that the father would take her to Nigeria for FGM. The parents were separated Nigerian nationals and both denied supporting FGM. A without-notice order was made and later extended pending a final hearing. The central issues were whether the alleged threat was proved and whether an FGM protection order should nevertheless be made in the child’s interests.

The application for a final FGM protection order was refused and all orders made in the proceedings were discharged.

1. The burden of proving the alleged abuse rested on the mother. The judge applied the balance of probabilities as a binary standard, having regard to Re H-N and Others (children) (domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448, Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 and Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35. Inherent probabilities were relevant, and the evidence had to be assessed across the whole canvas rather than in separate compartments, applying Re T [2004] 2 FLR 838. The judge also directed himself on the limited evidential value of lies by reference to R v Lucas [1981] QB 720.
2. The alleged conversation between the father and his mother about FGM was not proved. The judge accepted the evidence that the father’s family had opposed FGM for at least five generations. The father’s consideration of obtaining a passport or sending the child to Nigeria was foolish but was not shown to be connected with FGM. The evidence did not establish any intention by either family to subject the child to FGM.
3. Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 confers a broad power to protect a girl against the commission of a genital mutilation offence and requires regard to all the circumstances, including her health, safety and well-being. The judge did not decide the unresolved interrelationship with section 8(4) of the Children Act 1989, since that issue had not been argued.
4. In assessing risk, the judge considered the guidance in Re X (A Child) (FGMPO) [2019] 1 FLR 415 concerning real risk, protective factors and interference with family life. The additional analysis concerning separate terms of an order was not materially relevant because only a prohibition on FGM was sought.
5. The contextual macro-factors and individual micro-factors identified in Re X (Female Genital Mutilation Protection Order. No.2) [2019] EWHC 1990 (Fam) provided a useful framework. The mother supplied little evidence addressing those matters, while the father supplied strong evidence of family opposition to FGM. The court was not required to fill that evidential gap.
6. The court would not make an FGM protection order merely because both parents agreed that FGM should not occur. Since the mother had not established a real or other sufficient risk, the protective jurisdiction was not exercised and the existing orders were discharged.

The application was issued on 19 February 2026. A without-notice order was made on 20 February 2026 and extended on 19 March 2026, with further directions before the final hearing. No appellate decision is stated.