D v London Borough of Bromley and Ors (Special Restrictions – Refusal of Adoption Order)

Non-compliance with statutory safeguards governing intercountry adoption does not create an automatic bar to a domestic adoption order, nor does it require a separate “most exceptional circumstances” test. The court must carefully balance public policy and the child’s welfare throughout life, with welfare remaining paramount. Where section 83 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 is engaged, special restrictions applicable to the child’s country of origin form part of the public-policy assessment. A child’s immigration benefits are relevant but do not determine the outcome. The court may refuse an adoption order where the safeguards were bypassed and the evidence raises serious concerns about identity, consent, the foreign adoption process, trafficking, safeguarding, or the proposed adopter’s suitability.

D, a British resident, applied under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 to adopt F, a 17-year-old Nigerian national whom D purported to have adopted in Nigeria in 2019. F entered the United Kingdom in 2021. Nigeria was subject to special restrictions under the Children and Adoption Act 2006, but no exception was sought.

The application was opposed by the local authority. The Secretary of State intervened on the legal framework. The central issues were whether F had been brought into the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption, whether the statutory restrictions applied, and whether an adoption order was required by F’s welfare despite the alleged Nigerian adoption and the potential immigration consequences.

1. Application dismissed. The court refused the adoption order and made no order as to costs.
2. F had been brought into the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption within section 83(1)(a) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. The relevant purpose was the applicant’s subjective intention to obtain an adoption order through the English courts. It need not have been the sole or dominant purpose. The prior purported Nigerian adoption was not determinative.
3. Section 83(1)(b) was not engaged because F entered the jurisdiction more than twelve months after the purported Nigerian adoption. Section 83(1)(a), however, was sufficient to engage the statutory scheme. The special restrictions imposed on Nigeria under section 9 of the Children and Adoption Act 2006 therefore applied, and no exception had been obtained.
4. There was no heightened “most exceptional circumstances” test. The court had to conduct a careful analysis of public policy and welfare under section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Welfare throughout the child’s life remained paramount. Where welfare and public policy pointed in different directions, welfare would prevail, and an order could not be refused if refusal would materially deny Convention rights.
5. The Nigerian documentation was materially unreliable. The court could not safely establish F’s identity, parentage, the death of her mother, the validity of the Nigerian adoption, or the alleged payment of educational expenses. Those matters engaged the public-policy concerns underlying the restrictions on Nigerian adoptions.
6. F’s wishes, relationship with D, cultural connection, educational interests and possible immigration benefits were important but did not constitute a trump card. They had to be assessed alongside the continuing relationship with the Nigerian family, the possibility of trafficking, exposure to domestic abuse, D’s equivocal commitment to adoption, and her limited ability to meet F’s emotional and safeguarding needs.
7. The court concluded that welfare and public policy pointed in the same direction. Refusal was proportionate under article 8 of the Convention. The judgment was to be provided to the Chief Executive of Cafcass for consideration of the approach to guardianship cases involving countries on the Restricted List.