MER, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Where interim relief is intended to secure a claimant’s release on a fixed timetable, any necessary alternative accommodation should be secured rather than merely proposed. A mandatory order may require the practical steps needed to achieve that result, including medical assistance. A claimant who returns to court through no fault of their own and obtains the remedy sought will ordinarily be entitled to the reasonable costs of that hearing. A mandatory order may remain in force despite an application to vary or discharge it, with liberty to apply where an interested public body has not yet been heard.

This was a further urgent application for interim relief concerning the applicant’s continued detention. Earlier orders made by Hill J on the papers and Foster J at an interim hearing had established that the result should be the applicant’s release and had set a timetable. Essential checks delayed implementation of that timetable. Most terms of a draft order were agreed. The court had to determine the treatment of alternative accommodation, medical assistance, public-body involvement and the costs of the further hearing.

Further urgent interim relief was granted. Earlier orders had identified the applicant’s release as the required result, but essential checks meant that the timetable set by Foster J could not be achieved. The parties cooperated in narrowing the remaining disputes and agreed most of the terms of a draft order.

1. Where alternative accommodation might be required because a problem arose with the accommodation already identified, the Secretary of State was required to secure the alternative accommodation, not merely propose it. That obligation was necessary to produce the required result without another round of investigation and delay.
2. The order included provision for medical assistance. It was made as a mandatory order and stated that it would remain in force notwithstanding any application to vary or discharge it, while preserving liberty to apply.
3. The Metropolitan Police were included as an interested party because they had not been heard on that aspect of the order and might seek variation. The Probation Service was not added because it had completed its work. The court considered that further involvement of a public body, with attendant costs, should occur only where necessary.
4. The claimant had returned to court through no fault of his own and had obtained the remedy sought. The defendant was therefore ordered to pay the claimant’s reasonable costs of the further interim relief hearing, to be assessed if not agreed.

The court observed that urgent vacation applications should be listed only where absolutely necessary. The order was to be sealed and served, with the parties already aware of its terms.

This was a first-instance urgent interim-relief application, not an appeal. The judgment records these earlier procedural steps:

• Hill J: dealt with an earlier application on the papers.
• Foster J: dealt with an earlier interim relief hearing and set a timetable at the end of July.
• High Court (Administrative Court): heard the present further application and made a further mandatory interim order.