Mahim Khan v Alkivides David

A final charging order requires the court to consider all the circumstances, particularly the debtor’s personal circumstances and whether another creditor would be unduly prejudiced. A final third party debt order requires a debt due or accruing due, a third party within the jurisdiction and a debt situated within the jurisdiction. The court must then decide whether an order is right or just in all the circumstances. A creditor must identify any competing claimant it knows or believes exists; the debtor and third party must provide evidence of any competing claim known or believed by them.

Mahim Khan sought to enforce in England and Wales a Californian judgment against Alkivides David. An English default judgment entered on 1 August 2025, and amended on 5 August 2025, established that David owed $14,913,777.61 and £10,140 in costs. Earlier proceedings included a contempt finding and an £80,000 costs order ([2025] EWHC 2525 (KB); [2025] EWHC 3041 (KB)).

Khan applied for a final charging order over David’s interests in a London property and a final third party debt order over funds in David’s Revolut account. Dorsey & Whitney Trust Company LLC claimed prior equitable charges over the property; Revolut held a balance of £54,691.27. The applications were decided on the papers after a psychiatric report addressed David’s capacity and reasonable adjustments. The issues were whether either final order should be made and whether the Trustee’s requested protections should be included.

1. Disposition. The court made a final charging order in the claimant’s draft form and a final third party debt order in the claimant’s draft form.
2. Charging order. Under section 2 of the Charging Orders Act 1979, the court had jurisdiction to charge the defendant’s beneficial interests in the property. Section 1 gave the court a wide discretion; section 1(5) required consideration of all the circumstances, particularly the debtor’s personal circumstances and whether another creditor would be unduly prejudiced. The Trustee did not oppose a final order, and priority was not for determination on this application. The defendant’s assertion that the property was his only home lacked evidence and was contradicted by his references to residence in Antigua and Barbuda. Even if it were his only home, that circumstance, like his alleged disability, could be considered on a later application for sale. The requested recital about priority was otiose because the claimant had acknowledged the Trustee’s alleged charges would have priority if established. The Trustee was not entitled to prior notice of a sale application; it would have to be served with any such application. The requested 28-day notice provision was refused (paras [15]–[27]).
3. Third party debt order. The requirements were a debt due or accruing due from the third party to the judgment debtor, a third party within the jurisdiction, a debt situated within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, and a conclusion that an order was right or just in all the circumstances. The court could impose terms to achieve an equitable outcome: Nevskoe v UAB Baltijos [2023] BCC 689 and Novoship (UK) Limited v Mikhaylyuk [2014] 1 All ER (Comm) 993 (para [29]). Revolut confirmed a balance of £54,691.27, and the defendant did not dispute that the debt was situated in England. Revolut was incorporated in England, and the account terms were governed by English law and provided for proceedings in the English courts; the court therefore found the situs requirement satisfied, citing Hardy Exploration v India [2019] QB 544 (para [33]).
4. Competing claims to the account balance. The claimant was required to identify any person whose claim to the money she knew or believed existed. The defendant and Revolut were required to file evidence if either knew or believed another person had a claim. Neither did so. The defendant’s contention that the claimant had to establish that no competing claim existed was rejected (para [34]).

This was a first-instance decision on two enforcement applications. The judgment records the earlier default judgment and related contempt proceedings, including the resulting £80,000 costs order. It also records that permission to appeal the contempt order was refused; this judgment does not determine that appeal.