Tecnimont SpA & Anor v LLC Eurochem North-West-2 (Russia)

Where an arbitral tribunal has made a peremptory order, the principal mechanism for enforcement is the procedure in section 42 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The court should not use its general power under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to grant wider relief which cuts across the statutory arbitration framework, particularly where further recourse to the tribunal is available without material delay. The court may enforce a peremptory anti-suit order under section 42. Relief under section 37 is not the appropriate mechanism for enforcing an earlier court order where contempt proceedings are available.

The claimants sought anti-enforcement relief against a Russian company which had pursued Russian proceedings in breach of arbitration agreements and had begun enforcement proceedings in India and Malaysia. The application relied on section 42 of the Arbitration Act 1996 and, in the alternative, section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

The tribunal had made further peremptory orders requiring the defendant to confirm that it would not enforce the Russian orders and to withdraw or discontinue existing enforcement proceedings. The central issue was whether the court should grant broader protective relief under section 37 in addition to enforcing those peremptory orders under section 42.

1. Section 42 relief. The Court of Appeal had held that anti-suit relief could fall within the scope of section 42. An anti-enforcement injunction restraining proceedings to enforce an order obtained in breach of an anti-suit injunction was likewise within that scope. The court was satisfied that the defendant had failed to comply with the tribunal’s peremptory orders and ordered compliance under section 42.
2. Relationship between sections 42 and 37. The court proceeded on the assumption, without deciding the point, that it retained a discretion under section 37. That discretion had to be exercised in light of the arbitration regime and the structure created by the Arbitration Act 1996, including the principle that the court should not intervene except as provided by that Part.
3. Section 42 provides the mechanism for enforcing tribunal orders. Where a peremptory order is narrower than the original tribunal order, that is a matter between the parties and the tribunal. The applicant may seek further peremptory orders. Section 42(3), which provides that the court shall not act until available arbitral processes have been exhausted, indicates that recourse to the tribunal is intended to be primary.
4. The evidence did not show that further recourse to the tribunal would cause delay requiring additional relief under section 37. The tribunal had acted promptly when the further peremptory orders were sought.
5. Section 37 relief was also refused insofar as it was sought to support or enforce the earlier order of Butcher J. Contempt proceedings were available for breach of that order, and a section 37 anti-enforcement injunction was not the appropriate enforcement mechanism.
6. The order sought under section 42 was granted, subject to amendment of the draft order. The wider orders sought under section 37 were refused.

• High Court (Commercial Court): Butcher J made an earlier order under section 42 in November 2025, reported at [2025] EWHC 3151 (Comm).
• Court of Appeal: the appeal against that order was rejected in [2026] EWCA Civ 5.
• High Court (Commercial Court): the present application was granted under section 42 in respect of the later peremptory orders, but wider relief under section 37 was refused.