Alison Pinnock v The Independent Office for Police Conduct

A complaint under the police complaints scheme may be made orally. Where the IOPC has already treated an allegation as a complaint and directed that it be investigated, it cannot later exclude the allegation from an appeal simply because it was not restated as a separate head of complaint. A complaint described as police harassment need not establish a course of conduct under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to be considered under the Police Reform Act 2002. In deciding whether relief must be refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court must not speculate about the public authority’s future decision or determine the merits of the underlying complaint.

Ms Pinnock challenged the IOPC’s decision of 27 February 2025 not to uphold her appeal against the Metropolitan Police Service’s handling of her complaints. The complaints arose principally from her September 2015 arrest, but she said she had also complained during her police interview about earlier harassment by Metropolitan Police officers at the Nursing and Midwifery Council. The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police were interested parties.

Permission for judicial review was granted on three grounds. The court considered whether the IOPC could itself review material omitted from the MPS investigation, whether the NMC allegation was part of the complaint already made and required investigation, and whether relief should be withheld under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

1. September 2015 arrest. Under paragraphs 25(5)(b) and 25(8)(a) of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, the IOPC had to consider whether the investigation findings needed reconsideration and could review them without directing an immediate reinvestigation. It was not required to remit the complaint. The IOPC had reviewed the material the MPS had omitted and was entitled to find that it added no relevant information capable of affecting the outcome. The claimant had submitted the material and had an opportunity to comment on it. The decision not to uphold this part of her appeal was neither unlawful nor procedurally unfair.
2. The NMC complaint. The interview record showed that the claimant had alleged previous harassment by police officers at the NMC. Under section 12 of the Police Reform Act 2002, a complaint did not have to be in writing. The IOPC’s earlier appeal decision had found that the allegation amounted to a complaint and had directed that the complaint be handled under Schedule 3. Although the claimant should have identified the specific incidents more clearly, that did not remove the MPS’s obligation to clarify her general reference to earlier incidents in light of the earlier direction. The IOPC therefore erred when it later treated the NMC matter as outside the complaint and outside the appeal.
3. Meaning of harassment. The conclusion that the September 2015 arrest was justified did not dispose of the separate NMC allegation. A complaint under the 2002 Act did not have to establish a course of conduct within section 1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. A complainant may use harassment to describe unwanted conduct within section 26 of the Equality Act 2010, or to convey that an officer’s conduct was objectionable without invoking a statutory definition. The NMC allegation was therefore to be considered independently.
4. Relief and disposal. The court could not conclude under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 that it was highly likely the outcome would not have been substantially different. If the IOPC had considered the NMC issue, it could have upheld the appeal to that extent and then decided whether to determine the complaint itself or direct an investigation. The court could not predict the result of that future consideration or assess the underlying complaint’s merits. It quashed the IOPC decision insofar as it excluded the NMC complaint and required the IOPC to reconsider the appeal to that extent. The conclusions concerning the September 2015 arrest remained unaffected.

The claim was a first-instance judicial review. Permission was granted on 20 October 2025 on grounds 1, 4 and 6. Permission on the remaining grounds was refused on the papers and again on renewal on 27 January 2026.