Peter David Hall v Secretary of State for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs

For judicial review, time runs from the date the challenged decision was made, not the date the claimant learned of it. Later explanations do not restart time unless they amount to a fresh decision. An extension requires a broad assessment of whether there is good reason to extend time, including the delay, merits, prejudice and the public interest.

At permission stage, the court examines the lawfulness of a technical or scientific decision, not its correctness. A rationality challenge faces a high threshold, and extensive papers or submissions do not lower the arguability test. A challenge may fall within Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention where it concerns the exercise of powers under national law relating to the environment. The court refused an extension and permission, but held that the claim was an Aarhus Convention claim and applied the standard costs limits.

Peter Hall, a breeder of Hereford cattle and a member of the Hereford Cattle Society (HCS), challenged two decisions by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). The first introduced a Native Breed Support List that treated Hereford cattle as a whole breed, removing the separate at-risk listing on which Hall’s Hereford (Original Population) cattle had relied for agri-environment support. The second refused to investigate or take enforcement action against HCS under the Animal Breeding Regulation.

Hall sought permission to apply for judicial review, an extension of time for the challenge to the first decision, and Aarhus Convention costs protection. At the hearing he withdrew his request for the court to declare that the two Hereford populations were separate breeds. The court considered whether either decision was arguably unlawful and whether the claim came within Article 9(3) of the Convention.

1. Extension of time refused. The first decision was made on 2 June 2025, when Defra published the Government Response and the new list. Under CPR 54.5, time ran from that decision, not from the later provision of reasons. The August and September letters explained the decision but did not make fresh decisions. The claim should have been brought promptly and by 2 September 2025. The court considered R v Department of Transport ex parte Presvac Engineering (1992) 4 Admin LR 121 and applied the broad approach to extension set out in Maharaj v the National Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago [2019] UKPC 5. Hall knew the substance of the decision, was represented, and gave no good explanation for the delay. R (Macrae) v Herefordshire DC [2012] EWCA Civ 457 did not assist because the circumstances differed.

2. Permission concerning the first decision refused. The court had to assess arguable unlawfulness, not whether Defra’s policy choice was correct. The statutory power under section 1 of the Agriculture Act 2020 was broad and discretionary, and was not directly tied to the breed definitions in the Animal Breeding Regulation. Defra had consulted and relied on expert advice supporting a whole-breed conservation approach. It was open to Defra to adopt that approach for support payments, despite possible genetic differences between sub-populations. The court was very slow to find a scientific conclusion perverse: R (Mott) v Environment Agency [2016] 1 WLR 4338. Detailed papers did not dilute the real-prospect-of-success test at permission stage: R (Bayswater Support Group) v Health Research Authority [2026] EWHC 2043 (Admin). This was not a case of the clear legal error identified in R (World Uygher Congress) v National Crime Agency [2024] 1 WLR 4532. The challenge was, in substance, a disagreement with the merits of the policy.

3. Permission concerning the second decision refused. Defra’s duty under Article 47 of the Animal Breeding Regulation, as applied by the Zootechnical Standards (England) Regulations 2018, arose where non-compliance was established. Hall’s allegation depended on the disputed claim that HOP and NAD cattle were separate breeds. On the evidence and for the reasons given on the first decision, it was not arguable that Defra acted irrationally by declining to investigate or enforce. The court did not decide the separate dispute between Hall and HCS about breed composition.

4. The claim was an Aarhus Convention claim. Applying the Court of Appeal’s approach in R (Global Feedback Ltd) v HM Treasury & Anr [2025] EWCA Civ 624, a general assertion of environmental effect was insufficient. Here the challenge concerned statutory powers directed to conservation and environmental sustainability. The environmental connection was not tangential, so Article 9(3) applied.

5. Standard costs limits applied. The court proceeded on the basis that any necessary extension for filing Hall’s financial statement would be granted. Neither Defra nor HCS had made a compliant application under CPR 46.27 to vary or remove the limits. The standard limits in CPR 46.26 therefore applied. Hall was entitled to the costs of resolving Aarhus status, but, because that issue had been heard with the permission and extension applications, those costs were set off against the other parties’ costs. Following the usual permission-stage approach in R (Mount Cook Ltd) v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1346, Hall was ordered to pay £2,500 each to Defra and HCS.

This was a first-instance judicial review hearing. Lang J’s order of 17 March 2026 directed that permission, time and costs issues be determined at an oral hearing.