PNS, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An interim mandatory injunction requires a real issue to be tried, a strong prima facie case, strict necessity and a balance of convenience in favour. The court compares the harm of refusing relief if the claimant succeeds with the harm of granting it if the claim fails, including effects on other parties and the public. A public authority’s general allocation policy cannot displace its discretion to make case-specific exceptions. An injunction may be maintained where voluntary compliance is not assured and no less onerous measure will secure the required protection.

PNS, an asylum seeker, and her two children had been accommodated in London under arrangements made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department pursuant to section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. They were moved to Liverpool shortly before the school term began. PNS challenged the dispersal and sought urgent interim relief.

Fordham J granted a mandatory interim injunction requiring arrangements for their return to London. Thornton J extended the compliance date. The Secretary of State applied to discharge the injunction after issuing a further decision supporting accommodation in Liverpool, while also planning to return the family to London. The present hearing concerned whether the injunction remained necessary, what variations and case-management directions were appropriate, and the costs of the application.

1. The application to discharge the injunction was refused. The injunction was varied to require the Secretary of State to return PNS and the children to London by 4 pm on 3 October 2026, report on compliance and explain any failure. The Secretary of State was also required to give one week’s notice of any intention to return them to Liverpool pending the judicial review, so that a further application could be made if appropriate.

2. An interim mandatory injunction requires a real issue to be tried and, because the relief is mandatory, a strong prima facie case. The stipulated action must be strictly necessary, in the sense that no less onerous measure would achieve the same outcome. The balance of convenience must favour relief. It involves comparing the claimant’s harm if relief is refused but the claim succeeds with the harm to the defendant, affected parties and public if relief is granted but the claim fails. Reversibility and the public interest in lawful and effective public functions are also relevant. The judge applied the principles discussed in R (Medical Justice) v SSHD [2010] EWHC 1425 (Admin), R (FTDI Holding Ltd) v Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster [2025] EWHC 241 (Admin), R (RRR Manufacturing Pty Ltd) v British Standards Institution [2024] EWCA Civ 530 and the modified American Cyanamid test.

3. The injunction remained necessary. The Secretary of State’s position was that, if the injunction were discharged, the planned return to London would be abandoned; no assurance was given that the family would not be sent back to Liverpool after returning. In those circumstances, only an injunction would ensure their return and provide a means for the court to address any proposed further move.

4. For the purpose of the interim application, all four grounds of judicial review were strong. There was no evidence that the June decision allowing London accommodation had been an error; the later decision formalised the position taken before the dispersal rather than establishing a materially changed position. The legitimate-expectation ground was strongly arguable because no sufficiently strong countervailing public interest had been identified. It was also strongly arguable that fairness required consultation before withdrawing the benefit of the earlier discretionary decision. The challenge concerning the children’s welfare had particular force: the stated treatment of their best interests as a primary consideration was difficult to reconcile with the evidence about disruption to education and support, and the absence of arrangements for schooling in Liverpool. The relevant statutory context included section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 and regulation 13 of the Asylum Support Regulations 2000.

5. The balance of convenience strongly favoured continuity at the children’s London schools and access to their existing support. Any additional accommodation cost was unsupported by evidence, and no material third-party interest weighed against relief.

6. The claimant could amend the existing judicial review to address the September decision after disclosure. The September decision appeared to formalise the decision already challenged, rather than to be a wholly fresh decision. The case was not, in substance, a rolling judicial review; even if it were, a pragmatic and flexible exception to the default approach was appropriate, as in R (Spahiu) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 2604. Requiring a second claim and joining it would be less efficient and more costly. Permission to apply for judicial review remained to be determined after further pleadings and evidence. The Secretary of State was to pay the costs of the application.

• High Court: Fordham J granted an interim mandatory injunction on 19 September 2026. Thornton J extended the compliance date to 2 October 2026.
• High Court (Administrative Court): on the Secretary of State’s application to discharge the injunction, the court maintained it with variations and made case-management directions.