RMD v General Medical Council

A statutory challenge to an interim order is determined by the court as the primary decision-maker, with due respect for the specialist tribunal and intervention where its decision is wrong. An interim order for public protection requires evidence of a real and immediate risk to patient safety; serious allegations about private conduct do not by themselves establish that risk. A public-interest order requires more than hypothetical concern and must be justified on the evidence. Each condition must be necessary and proportionate. In civil proceedings, anonymity may be ordered only where it is strictly necessary, after balancing the competing rights and the interests of open justice.

A consultant nephrologist challenged interim conditions imposed by an Interim Orders Tribunal (IOT) while the General Medical Council investigated allegations of sexual misconduct in his private relationships. The IOT first imposed notification conditions in December 2025. At a review in June 2026, it continued those conditions and added a restriction on face-to-face consultations with female patients, save in life-threatening emergencies.

The claimant applied under section 41A(10)(b) of the Medical Act 1983 to revoke or vary the extant order. He argued that the conditions were not necessary for public protection, were not justified in the public interest and were disproportionate. The court also considered further evidence from one complainant that had not been before the IOT, and granted an anonymity order for the claimant, complainants, the claimant’s partner and children.

1. Order. The statutory application succeeded. The conditions of notification and the restriction on face-to-face treatment of female patients were revoked.
2. The court’s function. Under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983, the court acts as the primary decision-maker, not merely as a supervisory court. It must give due respect to the IOT’s expertise, particularly on public perception and confidence, but is not bound by its decision. It should intervene if that decision is wrong; “wrong” does not mean only wrong in law.
3. Evidence and fact-finding. The court may consider relevant evidence that was unavailable to the IOT and admitted Ms B’s later statement. Neither the IOT nor the court was to decide whether the disputed allegations were true. The task was to assess the nature, context and potential seriousness of the allegations on the evidence available.
4. Public protection. A public-protection order required a real and immediate risk to patient safety. The unsupported police log reference to a possible third complainant should not have been relied on: there was no formal complaint or supporting evidence, and the claimant had not been given notice or a fair opportunity to respond. The allegations concerned adult private relationships. There was no evidence that the claimant’s conduct had affected his clinical practice or posed a risk to patients. The IOT’s reliance on Dr X v GMC was misplaced: that case concerned allegations involving minors and did not establish that the private conduct alleged here created a clinical risk. The conditions were therefore not necessary for public protection.
5. Public interest. The public-interest ground has a high threshold. A hypothetical concern that a member of the public might have if no interim order were imposed is insufficient. The evidence, including the absence of patient harm, the claimant’s professional record and the domestic context of the allegations, did not justify an order on this ground.
6. Proportionality. Although unnecessary to the outcome, the court found that the conditions were also disproportionate. Each condition must be necessary, appropriate and workable. The IOT had not sufficiently considered the practical impact on the claimant and his patients. The additional restriction was not itself equivalent to a suspension, but its substantial impact did not make it proportionate. The original and additional conditions would have been set aside on this ground in any event.
7. Anonymity. Applying the open-justice presumption and balancing Articles 8 and 10, the court granted anonymity because naming the adults would risk identifying and exposing the claimant’s vulnerable children to damaging private information.

1. Interim Orders Tribunal. On 18 December 2025, the IOT imposed notification conditions. On 17 June 2026, it continued those conditions and added a restriction on face-to-face consultations with female patients, subject to a life-threatening emergency exception.
2. High Court (Administrative Court). On the claimant’s statutory application under section 41A(10)(b) of the Medical Act 1983, the court held the IOT’s order wrong and revoked the conditions.