Marius Ene v Alexandria District Court (Romania)

On an appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, the High Court must decide whether the extradition judge made an error producing a wrong overall evaluation. It is not a rehearing of the evidence.

Deliberate absence from trial requires proof of an unequivocal, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to attend. Mere lack of diligence, knowledge of an investigation, or an admission during investigation is insufficient. Contradictory information may render statements in an arrest warrant ambiguous.

Where box 3.4 is ticked, the formal statement of a right to retrial is sufficient, subject only to procedural steps, unless reliable evidence shows that the requesting state routinely disregards that obligation. In an Article 8 challenge, the children’s best interests are a primary consideration, but the public interest in extradition may outweigh them unless family consequences are exceptionally severe.

The appellant appealed, with permission from Linden J, against District Judge Bristow’s order of 17 December 2024 extraditing him to Romania under a conviction warrant. The warrant concerned a sentence of one year and eight months’ imprisonment for three driving offences committed in 2019.

The appeal challenged findings under section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, the proportionality of extradition under Article 8 of the Convention, and alleged abuse of process arising from the respondent’s handling of Romanian retrial rights. The appellant also sought to adduce fresh evidence concerning his family and children.

1. Appeal jurisdiction. The appeal was concerned with whether the District Judge’s decision was wrong. It was not a rehearing or a mere invitation to reweigh evidence. The appellate court could intervene where the overall evaluation was wrong: [2018] 1 W.L.R. 2889.
2. Section 20(3). “Deliberately absented himself from his trial” means an unequivocal waiver of the right to be present. The waiver must ordinarily be knowing and intelligent, requiring appreciation of the consequences. Extreme conduct may suffice without proof of actual knowledge that trial would proceed in absence, but the conduct here fell far short of that standard: [2022] UKSC 9.
3. The arrest warrant and further information were materially contradictory. The appellant was under investigation in 2020, had not then been charged, and had not entered a guilty plea. A later statement that he had been informed of the trial date and warned of conviction in absence could not cure those contradictions. “Personal” or “in person” service in the extradition context did not include deemed service by posting documents on a courthouse door or court website. The requesting authority therefore failed to prove deliberate absence to the criminal standard.
4. The ticking of box 3.2 did not establish that the appellant had mandated a lawyer. Further information showed that the public defender was appointed on the day of trial because the appellant had left Romania. The information made the warrant ambiguous and had to be considered.
5. Section 20(5). The defect in box 3.1a did not infect box 3.4. The latter was a discrete alternative. Applying [2024] UKSC 10, box 3.4, when ticked, constituted a formal statement securing a right to retrial, subject only to procedural steps. Article 466 of the Romanian Code alone was insufficient, but it became effective when coupled with the formal statement. There was no reliable evidence that Romanian authorities routinely disregarded such statements.
6. The principles in [2016] 1 WLR 3344 and [2024] UKSC 10 continued to apply under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The reasoning based on Article 6 of the Convention and mutual trust remained relevant after EU withdrawal. [2025] 1 CMLR 35 was not binding and did not require a different conclusion.
7. Article 8. The District Judge treated the children’s best interests as a primary consideration and was entitled to give substantial weight to the public interest in extradition. The fresh evidence did not satisfy the applicable requirements and would not have altered the overall evaluation. The asserted delay was not sufficiently culpable, the previous convictions could be given limited weight, and the electronically monitored curfew had no demonstrated practical impact and could not affect an otherwise unbalanced proportionality assessment.
8. The applications to adduce fresh evidence were refused. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the judgment of District Judge Bristow dated 17 December 2024. The appeal was dismissed.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: extradition proceedings were opened on 29 February 2024 after the appellant declined to consent to extradition.