Stacey Jessica Nurrish v Nursing and Midwifery Council

On an appeal by way of rehearing, the court must decide for itself whether a professional disciplinary panel was wrong or whether a serious procedural or other irregularity made the decision unjust. Deference is appropriate when the panel assessed oral evidence, particularly credibility and demeanour, but that deference is not absolute. A finding of deliberate dishonesty requires careful evaluation of whether discrepancies reflect dishonesty rather than confusion, mistake or misunderstanding. The witness must have a fair opportunity to address the allegation, and the reasons must show sufficient engagement with factors capable of explaining the apparent discrepancies. Where impairment and sanction depend on an unsafe finding of dishonesty, those conclusions cannot stand.

The appellant, formerly a nurse, admitted multiple instances of serious dishonesty and received a 12-month suspension from a Fitness to Practise Panel in February 2024. On review in January 2025, a differently constituted panel concluded that she had been deliberately dishonest in her oral evidence about caring roles described in two testimonials. It found continuing impairment and struck her off the nursing register.

The appellant appealed under articles 29 and 38 of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001. The central issues were whether the finding of dishonesty was wrong or unjust because of serious procedural or other irregularity, and whether the findings of impairment and sanction could survive if that finding was set aside.

1. Appeal allowed. The appeal was by way of rehearing under CPR rule 52.21(c)(3) and PD52D paragraph 19. The court had to exercise its own judgment on whether the panel’s decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. Appropriate deference was required, especially concerning findings based on oral evidence and demeanour, but the panel’s assessment was not inviolable.
2. The panel’s finding that the appellant had been deliberately dishonest in her evidence was unsafe and wrong. The hearing was conducted remotely, reducing the weight of demeanour evidence. The appellant was nervous, was questioned rapidly and repeatedly about an issue that had not been foreshadowed, and was never directly told that the panel might find that she was lying. Neither the respondent nor the appellant was invited to address that possibility in closing submissions, and the legal adviser gave no advice on the test for dishonesty or the caution required when assessing oral evidence.
3. The alleged discrepancies depended substantially on inferences from supportive testimonials rather than direct contradictions. The panel did not adequately consider the passage of time, the absence of oral evidence from the referees, the possibility that the testimonials presented a favourable account, the appellant’s admitted dishonesty in the original proceedings, or whether confusion and misunderstanding were more plausible explanations. Its brief reasons did not demonstrate the necessary engagement with those matters.
4. The finding of continuing impairment depended on the dishonesty finding and therefore could not stand. The striking-off sanction consequently fell away. Had the dishonesty finding been correct, the admitted persistent dishonesty and the absence of adequate remediation would have justified the sanction.
5. The findings of continuing impairment and striking off were set aside. The matter was to be remitted, subject to submissions, to a differently constituted panel to decide afresh whether the appellant remained impaired and, if so, the appropriate sanction.

The judgment describes an appeal from the January 2025 decision of a Nursing and Midwifery Council Fitness to Practise Panel. The panel found continuing impairment and ordered that the appellant be struck off. The High Court allowed the appeal, set those conclusions aside and directed reconsideration by a differently constituted panel.