SAL 1 v The Secretary of State for Education

On an appeal against a teacher prohibition order, the court normally conducts a review, unless the interests of justice require a rehearing. A professional conduct panel’s factual findings receive substantial respect because the panel heard the witnesses. The court will interfere only where the findings are unsupported by evidence or no reasonable panel could have reached them.

Duress must be considered as part of the evidence bearing on the allegations and any sanction, but the regulatory process creates no separate burden or issue of duress equivalent to the criminal defence. A panel may assess the evidence as a whole, including the alleged victim’s circumstances, opportunity for support and evidence of independent judgment. A reference to “extreme duress” is immaterial where the substance of the case has been considered. Decisions must be read fairly and as a whole.

SAL 1 appealed under CPR Part 52 against the Secretary of State’s order prohibiting her from teaching. The order followed a Professional Conduct Panel’s findings that she had sent a sexual communication to a person she knew or ought to have known was about 16 and that the conduct was sexually motivated. The order permitted an application for review after two years.

The appeal challenged the Panel’s treatment of alleged coercive control and duress, its assessment of expert, contemporaneous and character evidence, the finding of sexual motivation, its consideration of non-reporting, its reasons, and the burden and standard of proof. The parties agreed that the choice between review and rehearing would not affect the outcome.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appeal proceeded by way of review. The starting position for appeals against teacher prohibition orders is review, and no sufficient basis was advanced for a rehearing.
2. The Panel’s report had to be read fairly and as a whole. Although the Panel addressed fact-finding, UPC and sanction in stages, its conclusions on duress at the later stages related back to and relied on the evidence and findings made earlier. It therefore properly considered whether SAL 1 had experienced duress when sending the message and took that evidence into account both on the facts and on UPC.
3. The Panel was entitled to evaluate the evidence it heard directly. It could take into account that SAL 1 continued to live with her husband and children, was not isolated from other support, and described exercising independent judgment by carrying out a risk assessment. Its conclusion that the evidence did not establish that duress removed responsibility for the conduct was open to it.
4. The reference to “extreme duress” did not impose a legally erroneous test. It reflected the 2022 Guidance and the Appellant’s own case. In any event, the distinction between duress and extreme duress was not material because the Panel considered the substance of the asserted pressure and rejected it.
5. The burden of proving the allegations remained on the presenting officer throughout. The regulatory process involved no separate burden of proof on duress, and the criminal-law approach to raising and disproving the defence did not apply.
6. The Panel expressly considered the expert evidence, the limited contemporaneous evidence, evidence of coercive control and mental-health treatment, and character evidence. The weight given to that material was principally a matter for the Panel. The finding of sexual motivation, based on the sexual nature of the message and the absence of a plausible innocent explanation after rejection of the duress account, was open to it.
7. The Panel could consider the failure to report the message because SAL 1 addressed that matter in her evidence. Its reasons were adequate, and the remaining grounds added nothing substantive.

The Secretary of State’s prohibition order therefore stood, subject to its two-year review provision.

The judgment records an appeal under CPR Part 52 from a prohibition order made by the Secretary of State following a Professional Conduct Panel recommendation. No lower court judgment is identified.