Vasile Sorin Bardasu v Romanian Judicial Authority

In an extradition appeal raising Article 8 ECHR proportionality, delay must be assessed by reference to its particular circumstances. Delay by the issuing state may reduce the public interest in extradition. Delay by the executing state may increase the interference with private or family life, especially where relationships or private life developed during the delay.

A fugitive’s status attenuates, but does not extinguish, the weight of that interference. The decisive question on appeal is whether the extradition decision was wrong, viewed by reference to its outcome. An Article 8 objection will succeed only exceptionally, and fresh evidence is admitted under a strict test.

This was an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for the appellant’s extradition to Romania under a conviction warrant.

The appellant had been sentenced to three years and nine months’ imprisonment for tax evasion and driving with excess alcohol. He challenged the extradition order on the basis that unexplained delay in certification of the European Arrest Warrant had increased the impact on his private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. He also sought permission to rely on fresh evidence. Permission to appeal had been granted only on the Article 8 ground.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellate jurisdiction under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003 permits intervention only where the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently and that different decision would have required the appellant’s discharge.
2. Delay must be assessed carefully in the circumstances of each case. Delay between offending and extradition proceedings may diminish the public interest in extradition and increase the interference with private and family life. A distinct period of unexplained delay by the executing state may be particularly relevant where private life or family relationships developed during that period.
3. The weight given to executing-state delay principally depends on the impact shown on the requested person’s private and family life. Fugitive status may attenuate that weight but does not extinguish it. Even substantial weight may remain where the impact is very great.
4. The District Judge was entitled to find that the appellant’s private and family life was limited in evidentially demonstrated extent, and that there was no substantial evidence that the certification delay had materially increased the impact of extradition. In those circumstances, the delay did not meaningfully outweigh the strong public interest in returning a fugitive to serve a substantial sentence for serious offending.
5. The Article 8 conclusion was also sustainable as an overall evaluation. Such cases are rare; extradition will be disproportionate on Article 8 grounds only in cases involving an exceptionally severe impact on family life. The appellant’s case did not approach that threshold.
6. The fresh evidence application was refused. Applying the strict Fenyvesi test, the evidence was available, or could reasonably have been obtained, before the extradition hearing and would not have produced a different result.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Matson ordered extradition on 4 February 2025. The High Court dismissed the appeal and refused the application to admit fresh evidence.
• Permission to appeal was granted on the Article 8 ground only.