T (A Child) (Non-Agency Adoption), Re

In deciding between competing adoptive placements, the court must undertake a full, comparative and lifelong welfare evaluation. The phrase “nothing else will do” is a conclusion drawn from necessity and proportionality, not a shortcut replacing that evaluation. There is no presumption in favour of upbringing within the birth family.

Important weight should be given to placing siblings together, but that consideration is not decisive. A child may properly remain with foster carers who have become the child’s only family where removal would cause serious trauma and would be contrary to the child’s lifelong welfare. Post-adoption contact may be ordered to preserve and develop the sibling relationship, although imposed contact remains unusual where adopters oppose it.

The applicants had cared for T from five days after her birth and sought an injunction preventing her removal and a non-agency adoption order. The local authority opposed their application and proposed placing T with her younger maternal half-sister, R, who had already moved to prospective adopters.

The evidence addressed T’s secure attachment to the applicants, the relationship between the siblings, the delay in permanence planning, and the welfare consequences of each placement. The court also considered procedural defects concerning issue and service of the adoption application, the statutory notice period, parental involvement and post-adoption contact.

The central issue was which placement best served T’s welfare throughout her life.

1. Outcome. The court granted the applicants’ injunction relief, made an adoption order in their favour and rejected the local authority’s proposal that T should be placed with R and R’s adoptive family.

2. The court accepted that the statutory requirements for a non-agency adoption were met. The applicants had given the necessary notice under section 44 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Procedural defects concerning medical evidence and service did not invalidate the application and could be remedied or the relevant time extended under the Family Procedure Rules.

3. Applying section 1 of the 2002 Act, the court undertook a comparative welfare assessment of the realistic options. T’s welfare throughout her life was paramount. Her secure attachment to the applicants, their four sons, home and wider family was the decisive consideration. Removing her at three would cause trauma akin to bereavement, with short- and long-term consequences.

4. The court placed great weight on the importance of sibling relationships and on the statutory guidance favouring joint placement. That was not an absolute rule. The welfare analysis required the court to balance the certain trauma of removing T from her existing family against the risk of future emotional harm arising from separation from R and questions concerning identity and belonging.

5. The court rejected the proposition that the closeness of T’s relationship with R could determine the lifelong welfare decision. The relationship was nevertheless important. Contact was fundamental to T’s identity and development, rather than merely mitigation for separation.

6. The strict necessity and proportionality test for adoption was satisfied. The court dispensed with the mother’s consent under section 52(1)(b) because T’s welfare required it. Any interference with Article 8 rights was lawful, proportionate and necessary to safeguard T’s welfare.

7. Under section 51A of the 2002 Act, the court made a post-adoption contact order requiring contact between T and R, with the consent of R’s adopters. There were to be at least six meaningful visits each year, mainly during school holidays, together with indirect video contact.