RKC1 & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Affairs & Anor

A clear promise by a public authority to try to achieve a person’s departure may create a legitimate expectation that reasonable steps will be taken within a reasonable time. That obligation may require the authority to ask another department to provide assistance needed to achieve the promised outcome. A cohort policy may be rational, but its application without considering materially distinct individual circumstances can be unlawful. Affected persons should ordinarily be informed of decisions specifically affecting them. Article 8 does not generally require diplomatic or consular assistance to persons outside the United Kingdom, including guarantees to a transit state. Decisions concerning biometric safeguards and national security attract substantial judicial deference, provided relevant factors are considered rationally. Different treatment between cohorts may be justified by distinct and substantial foreign-policy objectives.

The claimants were six children living in Gaza who sought reunion in the United Kingdom with their refugee father. They had received positive predeterminations under the Unsafe Journey Policy and were minded to receive entry clearance subject to biometric enrolment and checks. The Foreign Secretary had agreed to try to support their departure from Gaza, but the Home Secretary did not initially provide the onward travel assurance required by Jordan.

The claim challenged decisions made in September and October 2025, and a further ministerial refusal of an onward travel assurance on 18 December 2025. The issues included legitimate expectation, irrationality, procedural fairness, inconsistent treatment, and rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention.

1. Initial decisions. The claimants had a legitimate expectation, arising from the Foreign Secretary’s clear and unqualified promise, that reasonable steps would be taken in good faith to try to effect their departure from Gaza within a reasonable time. Seeking Israeli clearance was insufficient. The Foreign Secretary acted unlawfully by failing, until about 18 November 2025, to ask the Home Secretary whether she would provide the onward travel assurance required by Jordan.
2. The cohort decision not to provide assurances to exceptional consular cases was rational and was not itself challenged successfully. However, it was irrational to apply that decision to the claimants without considering their individual circumstances. It was also unlawful not to inform them of the September and October decisions, given the promise to assist their departure and the direct effect of the decisions on their case.
3. The different treatment of the claimants and the medevac and student cohorts was rational on a cohort basis. Those cohorts involved substantial foreign-policy objectives and additional third-party assurances which did not apply in the claimants’ case.
4. Article 8 did not apply to the refusal to provide an onward travel guarantee to Jordan. Following R (BEL) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] 4 WLR 103, the Convention did not impose a positive obligation to provide diplomatic or consular assistance to persons outside the United Kingdom. Article 14 therefore had no application. Alternatively, individual consideration would have been required if Article 8 or 14 had applied.
5. The 18 December 2025 refusal was lawful. The ministerial materials represented a genuine consideration of the individual case. It was rational to attach weight to the risks of alias travel, adverse biometric information and national security concerns, and to distinguish Israeli checks from UK biometric checks. It was also rational to consider precedent and the different foreign-policy objectives of other cohorts. The decision fell within the substantial margin accorded to executive judgments concerning national and border security.
6. Permission was granted for all challenges. On the merits, the challenges to the September and October decisions succeeded on the three grounds identified above. All other challenges, including those to the 18 December decision, were dismissed.

First-instance judicial review judgment. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.