Mariusz Tadeusz Przezminski v Regional Court in Wloclawek (Poland)

A person may be a fugitive even without breaching an express restriction on leaving the requesting state or a crystallised duty to surrender. The question is whether the person deliberately and knowingly placed themselves beyond the reach of the relevant legal process. A suspended sentence remains part of that process and may support fugitivity where the person knowingly breaches its conditions and conceals their whereabouts. On an Article 8 extradition challenge, the public interest is especially strong where the person has committed further offences and risks treating the United Kingdom as a safe haven. Family-life arguments will succeed only in cases of exceptionally severe impact. An appellate court conducting its own proportionality assessment should remain guided by the first-instance judge’s findings based on live evidence.

The claimant appealed against District Judge Turnock’s decision of 10 October 2024 ordering his extradition to Poland under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. Poland sought his return to serve a three-year sentence, originally suspended, arising from convictions for organised contactless-card fraud, related substantive offences and money laundering.

The appeal concerned whether the claimant was properly found to be a fugitive and, if not, whether the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise nevertheless supported extradition. The claimant relied on his family life in the United Kingdom and argued that he had no duty to return to Poland or place himself within reach of its legal process.

1. Appeal dismissed. The finding of fugitivity was properly open to the District Judge on the evidence.
2. The governing principle, drawn from Ristin v Romania [2022] EWHC 3163 (Admin), is that a person is a fugitive where they deliberately and knowingly place themselves beyond the reach of the relevant legal process. A person need not have left the requesting state in breach of an express restriction, nor need there have been an existing duty to surrender.
3. De Zorzi v Appeal Court of Paris, France [2019] EWHC 2062 (Admin) was materially different. There, the requested person had left with the court’s express permission, had complied with obligations to keep in touch and had not concealed her whereabouts. Those distinctive features were absent here.
4. The claimant had pleaded guilty in Poland, agreed to the suspended sentence, was represented at sentencing, and had discussed further offending with his probation officer. The District Judge was entitled to infer that he understood the sentence and its potential activation. His failure to disclose his Halifax address, failure to regularise his immigration status, continued absence from Poland and subsequent offending supported the conclusion that he deliberately placed himself beyond the Polish authorities’ reach. The reasoning in Wisniewski v Regional Court of Wroclaw, Poland [2016] EWHC 386 (Admin) was applicable. The claimant’s position was also materially different from that in Pillar-Neumann v Austria [2017] EWHC 3371 (Admin).
5. If required, the court would have conducted the Article 8 balancing exercise afresh, while remaining guided by the District Judge’s assessment of the live evidence and factual inferences. The public interest in extradition was substantial, given the organised criminality, numerous offences and sentence. The claimant’s further offending while subject to a suspended sentence increased the safe-haven concern. Applying Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23, the effect on family life was painful and disruptive but not exceptionally severe. Extradition was therefore proportionate.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against District Judge Turnock’s extradition order dated 10 October 2024 was dismissed.