Mikolaj Heidrych v District Court in Bydgoszcz, Poland

In an extradition appeal, delay must be addressed in the Article 8 and statutory proportionality balance, including where the requested person is a fugitive. Fugitivity reduces the weight attributable to delay but does not automatically eliminate it. The appellate court should intervene only for an error of law, failure to consider a relevant matter, consideration of an irrelevant matter, or a conclusion outside the available evidence. Where delay was considered and the judge’s assessment was open on the facts, a challenge that merely invites a different weighting of the factors has no real prospect of success.

The applicant sought permission to appeal against a Westminster Magistrates’ Court order for his extradition to Poland on two offences. The District Judge discharged him on two other offences because the dual-criminality requirement was not satisfied. The applicant argued that a six-year gap between the Polish warrant and its certification in the United Kingdom was culpable and should have weighed decisively against extradition under Article 8 and section 21A of the Extradition Act 2003. Permission had been refused on the papers. The renewed application raised whether the District Judge had lawfully assessed the delay, the applicant’s fugitivity and the competing public and private interests.

1. The renewed application was refused. The proposed appeal did not disclose an arguable error of law or any other basis giving the appeal a real prospect of success.
2. The appellate court’s role was limited. In an extradition appeal it may intervene where the lower court erred in law, considered an irrelevant matter, failed to consider a relevant matter, or reached a conclusion unavailable on the material. It must not simply re-weigh factors already addressed.
3. Delay may be relevant to the Article 8 balance and to the proportionality cross-check under section 21A of the Extradition Act 2003. Fugitivity is a powerful factor in the public interest, but it does not require all delay to be attributed to the requested person. The District Judge had lawfully recognised that some delay was systemic and connected with the loss of access to EU databases after the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union.
4. The inference that the authorities knew the applicant was in the United Kingdom from the date of an English translation of the warrant was not established by the material. Even if that inference were available, delay had not been ignored. The District Judge had taken it into account in the balancing exercise.
5. The countervailing factors were substantial: the applicant had deliberately placed himself beyond the Polish court’s reach, the remaining offending involved the importation of almost one kilogram of cannabis, and there were no dependants or caring responsibilities in the United Kingdom. The District Judge had also considered the applicant’s private life, family support and approximately 16 months spent in custody. His conclusion that extradition remained proportionate was open to him.
6. The possibility that another judge might have given delay greater weight did not make the decision arguably wrong. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 28 March 2025 the District Judge ordered extradition on two offences and discharged the applicant on two others. An extradition order was sealed on 11 April 2025.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission to appeal was refused on the papers by Turner J on 17 December 2025. The renewed application was refused by Sweeting J on 6 March 2026.