The Director of Public Prosecutions v Liam Óg Ó Hannaidh

Where criminal proceedings are initiated by written charge under section 29(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, they are instituted when the written charge is issued. The same meaning applies to “instituted” in section 117 of the Terrorism Act 2000 where the provisions operate in closely related contexts. Required consent and Attorney General permission must therefore exist before issue. Proceedings issued without them are a nullity. Section 25(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 preserves only arrest, warrants and remand. It does not validate institution. If no valid written charge is issued within the six-month limit in section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, the magistrates’ court has no jurisdiction to try the summary offence.

The DPP appealed by case stated against the Chief Magistrate’s ruling that the Westminster Magistrates’ Court had no jurisdiction to try a charge under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000. A written charge and requisition were issued on 21 May 2025, within six months of the alleged offence, but the Attorney General’s permission for the DPP to give consent was not obtained until 22 May. A second charge issued on 22 May was out of time. The central issues were when proceedings were instituted under the written charge procedure, whether the first charge was invalid for want of prior permission, and whether section 25(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 saved the proceedings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The first written charge was issued on 21 May 2025. Under section 29(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, that was when the proceedings were instituted.
2. The word “instituted” in section 117(2)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000 has the same meaning in this context. The statutory scheme requires the DPP’s consent, and where applicable the Attorney General’s permission, before institution. The first charge was consequently a nullity because permission had not yet been given.
3. Section 25(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 is confined to emergency measures necessary for apprehension, arrest, charging and remand. It does not validate the institution of proceedings or later procedural steps. The reasoning in R v Lambert was binding on this point and was confirmed in R v Welsh (Christopher)(Junior) and R v Lalchan.
4. The court adopted the statutory approach in R v Bull: whether proceedings have been instituted depends on the particular procedure. The written charge procedure is created by statute, and section 29(1) supplies the answer directly. The court also adopted the relevant reasoning in Brown v DPP and DPP v Macfarlane that issue occurs before service.
5. Because the first charge was void and the second was issued more than six months after the alleged offence, section 127(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 barred trial. The respondent was neither convicted nor acquitted and would not be tried.

High Court (Administrative Court): The Divisional Court heard the DPP’s appeal by case stated and dismissed it, upholding the Chief Magistrate’s ruling that the magistrates’ court had no jurisdiction.