Kirste Andrea Grass, R (on the application of) v First-Tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) (Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Tribunal)

Paragraph 13 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990 permits reconsideration of a final award only where there has been a serious change in the applicant’s medical condition and injustice would otherwise result. A serious change means an adverse change in the substantive state of health which significantly increases disability. A change in diagnosis or prognosis is not, by itself, a change in medical condition. Unexpected longevity, assessed by reference to statistical data and improved care, does not necessarily alter the applicant’s substantive health or level of disablement. The provision is deliberately restrictive and must be construed according to its ordinary meaning, in the context and purpose of the Scheme, including finality and economy.

The claimant, who suffered catastrophic brain injury as a baby, received a final criminal injuries compensation award in 2010. The award was assessed on the basis that she was unlikely to live beyond 20. She later outlived that prediction. Her deputy applied for reconsideration under paragraph 13 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990, relying principally on the increased life expectancy and the future cost of professional care.

The First-tier Tribunal refused to reopen the case. It concluded that the claimant’s substantive medical condition and overall disablement remained substantially unchanged, and that life expectancy was not part of her medical condition. The claimant sought judicial review, alleging errors concerning the meaning of serious change in medical condition and the need for extensive enquiries.

1. Claim dismissed. The Tribunal’s decision was soundly reasoned and rational.
2. Paragraph 13 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990 must be given its ordinary natural meaning, construed in the context of the Scheme as a whole and with regard to its evident purpose. Finality in compensation awards and economy in the investigation of late claims are relevant considerations.
3. The provision contains separate requirements: a change in medical condition, seriousness, direct attribution to the original crime, and injustice if the original assessment stands. The approach in R (Criminal Injuries Compensation Board), ex parte Williams [2000] PIQR Q339 was binding and helpful. A change in diagnosis or prognosis is not itself a change in medical condition.
4. A serious change means an adverse change in the substantive state of health which significantly increases disability. The claimant’s increased life expectancy did not satisfy that requirement. It was an assessment based on statistical cohorts and was different in kind from the duration of her condition. It did not form part of, or affect, her substantive state of health.
5. The increased life expectancy resulted from continued high-quality care and newer statistical evidence, rather than a change in medical condition. The claimant’s altered care needs and financial consequences did not establish a serious change within paragraph 13.
6. The Tribunal was entitled to distinguish life expectancy from the duration of a medical condition, notwithstanding that duration may affect the level of disablement. Ground 1 therefore failed. Ground 2 did not require determination.

• First-tier Tribunal: On 2 April 2024, refused the application to reconsider the claimant’s case under paragraph 13 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission for judicial review was granted on renewal. The claim was dismissed on 11 March 2026.