Regional Court in Gdansk (Poland) v Andrzej Grzymala

For section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, the requesting state must prove to the criminal standard that a person convicted in absence deliberately absented himself from trial. The arrest warrant ordinarily supplies the necessary evidence, but the court may consider further information provided by the requesting state when determining whether the warrant is ambiguous or confused. An unresolved contradiction may prevent proof of deliberate absence. The place or method of personal service need not ordinarily be stated in the warrant. Personal service of a non-coercive summons abroad does not, without more, breach territorial sovereignty or circumvent the extradition regime. Where ambiguity remains unresolved, discharge may be upheld without a further adjournment.

The Regional Court in Gdansk appealed against a District Judge’s decision ordering Andrzej Grzymala’s discharge under section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003. The arrest warrant stated that he had been personally summoned on 11 June 2018 and warned that the case could proceed in his absence. Further information instead described his being presented with charges in June 2017, providing a Polish address, and failing to collect letters sent there. The District Judge found ambiguity and confusion, held that deliberate absence had not been proved, and ordered discharge. The High Court considered the evidential effect of the warrant and further information, the relevance of the location of any summons, and whether further information should have been sought before discharge.

1. Appeal dismissed. Under sections 28 and 29(3) of the Extradition Act 2003, the appellant had to show that the District Judge ought to have decided the relevant question differently and that the correct decision would not have required discharge.
2. Deliberate absence under section 20(3) reflects an unequivocal waiver of the Article 6 right to attend trial. Waiver must be effective, knowing and intelligent. Mere lack of diligence is insufficient. The requesting state bears the criminal-standard burden, and the arrest warrant will ordinarily provide the necessary evidence where it contains the information required by Article 4a.
3. The warrant was clear when read alone. However, the court was entitled to consider further information supplied by the requesting authority when seeking to understand it. The warrant’s assertion of personal service in June 2018 conflicted with the further information’s account of charges presented in June 2017 and letters sent to a Polish address. The unresolved ambiguity meant that the appellant could not prove that any personal summons had occurred, or that the respondent had been summoned as envisaged by Article 4a(1)(a)(i).
4. The place of service was not required to be stated in box D, 3.1a. Even assuming personal service in the United Kingdom, a non-coercive summons was materially different from an arrest warrant and did not necessarily circumvent the extradition regime or infringe territorial sovereignty. The District Judge’s contrary conclusion was rejected, but it was immaterial to the result.
5. The District Judge was not required to adjourn to obtain further information. The requesting state had ample opportunity to obtain it before the decision, and the issue was a discretionary case-management matter. Discharge was therefore upheld.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal dismissed and the District Judge’s discharge order upheld.
• District Judge: section 20 challenge succeeded and the respondent was discharged under section 21(2) of the Extradition Act 2003.
• High Court: permission to appeal granted on 11 April 2025.