JXK & Anor v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police

Vicarious liability for deliberate wrongdoing requires a close connection between the wrongful conduct and the functions the tortfeasor was authorised to perform. The mere fact that employment provided the opportunity or means to commit the wrong is insufficient. Nor is liability established merely because the conduct falls broadly within the class of acts the employee was engaged to perform, where it represents a clear departure from authorised duties and amounts to pursuit of personal interests. These principles apply to deliberate torts, including misfeasance in public office. Criminal, expressly prohibited conduct involving misuse of sensitive police data was therefore outside the course of employment.

Police officers accessed and misused personal data and disclosed third-party data. One officer pleaded guilty to 31 offences under data protection and computer misuse legislation. The claimants alleged breaches of data protection legislation and misfeasance in public office against the Chief Constable.

The defendant applied to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment, arguing that the officer’s conduct could not impose vicarious liability under Police Act 1996, section 88. The central issue was whether the pleaded wrongdoing was sufficiently closely connected with the officer’s functions to engage vicarious liability.

1. Disposition. The claimants’ case had no reasonable prospects of success. Judgment was entered for the defendant and the claim was dismissed.
2. The court accepted the procedural principles governing strike out and summary judgment. The pleaded case had to be taken at its highest for strike-out purposes, while extrinsic evidence could be considered on summary judgment without conducting a mini-trial.
3. Section 88 of the Police Act 1996 imposed responsibility for wrongs committed in the performance or purported performance of police functions in like manner to an employer’s responsibility for servants’ wrongdoing in the course of employment. The relevant question remained whether there was a close connection between the wrongful acts and the authorised functions.
4. The principles summarised in Ali v Luton [2022] EWHC 132 (QB) were of general application. Opportunity alone was insufficient. Conduct could fall within the broad class of acts the officer was authorised to perform yet depart so clearly from the scope of employment that vicarious liability was excluded. A person pursuing personal interests, or on a frolic of their own, was not acting in the course of employment.
5. The officer’s accessing and dissemination of sensitive police data were expressly prohibited, criminal, contrary to policy and wholly divorced from the functions of a constable. The only connection was that his position provided the means to commit the wrong. That was not a close connection.
6. The same reasoning applied to all pleaded claims, including misfeasance in public office. The court applied the principle recognised in Racz v The Home Office [1994] 2 AC 45 that deliberate wrongdoing may attract vicarious liability in appropriate circumstances, but only where the core close-connection requirement is satisfied.
7. The limitation application under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 was unnecessary to determine because the claim had ended. The court also considered, but did not decide, procedural questions concerning transfer from the Media and Communications List under the Civil Procedure Rules.