The Howard League for Penal Reform, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Justice

In a process-rationality challenge, the court must rigorously examine the reasoning supporting a decision, particularly where serious interests are affected. The decision-maker must address mandatory relevant considerations and avoid logical errors, critical gaps and unexplained evidential leaps. The court must remain sensitive to the decision-maker’s evaluative and policy judgment, especially in managing custodial risk.

The public sector equality duty is a duty of process. It requires due regard, before and during policy formation, to equality objectives and potential adverse impacts. It does not require a particular outcome, a precise mathematical assessment, or every possible further inquiry. The Tameside duty similarly requires only reasonable steps to inform the decision-maker. Those duties were satisfied where extensive evidence-gathering, equality analysis, consultation, safeguards and continuing evaluation informed the decision.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision of 24 April 2025 authorising specially trained staff to use pelargonic acid vanillylamide spray in three young offender institutions for 12 months.

The challenge alleged process irrationality; breach of the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010; and failure to make reasonable inquiries under the Tameside duty, including inquiries into violence, medical effects and disproportionate impact on children with protected characteristics.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission intervened. The central issues were whether the decision-maker had misunderstood the purpose or evidence concerning PAVA, had failed to have due regard to equality impacts, or had failed to obtain information reasonably necessary for an informed decision.

1. Ground 3 dismissed. The decision was not taken on the premise that PAVA would reduce violence overall. Its purpose was to reduce the risk of immediate, serious and potentially life-changing harm during exceptional incidents which could not safely be managed by other methods. The Secretary of State was repeatedly informed that PAVA was unlikely to reduce overall violence.
2. Process rationality includes attention to mandatory relevant considerations and reasoning free from logical error, critical gaps and unexplained evidential leaps. Given the potentially serious physical and psychological effects on children in custody, anxious scrutiny was appropriate. That did not remove the Secretary of State’s latitude in balancing competing custodial risks and policy considerations.
3. The evidence, including the 2023 Bosworth paper and a 120-event observational review concerning younger prisoners, provided a rational basis for concluding that PAVA could reduce the risk of imminent serious harm. The Secretary of State was entitled to use adult-estate evidence with caution, while recognising differences between adults and children and adopting safeguards directed to those differences.
4. Ground 1 dismissed. The Secretary of State complied with section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. Equality analyses, a Child Rights Impact Assessment, consultation and ministerial consideration addressed race, religion, disability, neurodiversity, trauma and sex. The PSED required due regard, not a particular result or precise quantification of adverse impact. The adopted safeguards formed part of the equality analysis.
5. Ground 2 dismissed. The Tameside duty required reasonable steps to inform the decision-maker. The extensive inquiries were sufficient. The court would not intervene merely because further inquiries might have been sensible or desirable, and no reasonable Secretary of State with the material available could have considered the inquiries inadequate.
6. Two additional witness statements were refused. They contained expert opinion, lacked the required safeguards for expert evidence, and were not reasonably required to resolve the proceedings under CPR Part 35. The claim was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The claim challenging the Secretary of State’s decision was dismissed.