Friends of Gillingham (Norfolk) Countryside Community Interest Company, R (on the application of) v South Norfolk District Council

Permission for judicial review of a planning permission should be refused where none of the proposed grounds is arguable. Committee debates may be considered, including officers’ interventions, but must be read in context and not treated as decisive because of isolated remarks. The adequacy of consultation on amendments is judged objectively; individual notification of every objector is not necessarily required. Whether an amendment makes development substantially different is ordinarily a matter of planning judgment, reviewable on ordinary public law grounds. Planning guidance is not automatically mandatory, and a claimant challenging an assessment must identify an arguable legal error or adverse consequence. A planning condition must be reasonable and precise. In EIA screening, the predictable effects of mitigation may be taken into account, and an apparent textual inconsistency may be corrected by reading the document fairly as a whole.

The claimant, a representative of local objectors, challenged the defendant council’s grant of planning permission for an expansion of roadside services. The application had been amended several times, including by removing proposed battery storage facilities. The claimant alleged misleading consideration of a permissive footpath, unfair consultation, inadequate retail and flood-risk sequential assessments, unlawful treatment of wastewater capacity, and defective EIA screening.

All five grounds were initially refused permission as unarguable by David Elvin KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 9 February 2026. The claimant renewed the grounds before the present court. The central issue was whether any ground disclosed an arguable public law error warranting permission for judicial review.

1. Outcome. Permission for judicial review was refused because none of the five grounds was arguable.
2. Committee debate and footpath. The debate had to be read as a whole. Although officers’ interventions could assist in identifying what mattered to members, isolated statements should be treated cautiously. The committee’s concern was the path’s dimensions and shared use by pedestrians and cyclists, not a guarantee of permanent public access. The conditions therefore did not fail to secure an assurance given to members, nor unlawfully require dedication contrary to DB Symmetry Limited v Swindon Borough Council [2022] UKSC 33. “In perpetuity” in the earlier condition required physical retention, not access at all times.
3. Consultation and amendments. The council’s duty was to consult in a manner roughly equivalent to the original exercise, not necessarily to notify every objector individually. Fourteen days was objectively reasonable. Removing battery storage and making consequential landscaping changes did not arguably make the development substantially different. The issue was one of planning judgment and was not irrational.
4. Sequential assessments and enquiry. The assessments were considered in the officer’s report. Disaggregation of an extension from the facility being extended could rationally be treated as artificial. The Tameside duty did not require perfection. Failure to follow PPG guidance was not automatically a legal error; the claimant had to identify an arguable irrationality or adverse consequence. Section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not reverse that prior question.
5. Wastewater and EIA screening. The council rationally concluded that the proposed wastewater condition was neither reasonable nor precise. The screening opinion, read fairly and in context, did not conclude that significant environmental effects were likely after mitigation. It was permissible to take predictable mitigation into account, and the isolated word “yes” was a typographical error. The claim was refused permission.

• High Court (Planning Court): Permission for judicial review was refused on all five grounds. The grounds had previously been dismissed as unarguable by David Elvin KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, by order dated 9 February 2026.