R v Keith Preddie

A representation order should not be construed more narrowly than its wording requires. Where it permits work at junior advocate rates after a case is sent for trial, an ambiguity as to the identity or number of junior advocates may permit remuneration for work performed by more than one advocate. A leading advocate may be remunerated at junior rates even where the circumstances do not involve a change of status during the period of work. Remuneration decisions should consider the evidence as a whole and are not confined to court records. Reasonably incurred work may be remitted for assessment, subject to checking for duplication.

The appellant, a leading advocate instructed in a murder retrial, appealed against the disallowance of 33 hours of preparatory work undertaken before a representation order was varied to cover leading and junior counsel because the proceedings were unusually grave or difficult.

The original representation order covered work by a litigator and, once the case had been sent for trial, work by a junior advocate. The respondent accepted remuneration for the appellant’s work after the variation but disputed the earlier hours. The central issue was whether the original order could permit the appellant to claim those hours at junior advocate rates.

1. The appeal was allowed in principle. The appellant was entitled to remuneration for the 33 hours of work undertaken before 8 August 2024, subject to assessment and the applicable junior rates.
2. The original representation order was ambiguous. Although it referred to a litigator in the singular and named the litigator’s firm, it also referred to junior advocate work once the case had been sent for trial. It could therefore be construed broadly, or at least not as narrowly as the respondent contended, so as to permit claims by more than one advocate at junior rates.
3. The order did not permit remuneration above junior rates for the disputed period. The appellant accepted that limitation, and the court applied it.
4. Paragraph 2.27 of the Crown Court Fee Guidance, concerning multiple advocates, did not address these circumstances because it appeared directed to orders unambiguously covering one advocate or expressly naming multiple advocates. Paragraph 1.4 supported the conclusion that the ambiguous order permitted claims by more than one advocate, subject to junior rates.
5. Under paragraph 4 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, claims had been submitted by each instructed advocate as required by paragraph 4(2), while paragraph 26 set out the respondent’s obligations in implementing payment. The respondent therefore erred in finding that the appellant had not been instructed before 8 August 2024.
6. The respondent also erred in treating a leading advocate’s limitation to junior rates as confined to cases where the advocate obtained KC status during the relevant period. That was not the only possible situation in which junior rates could apply.
7. The respondent had relied too heavily on the court record. The regulations did not require remuneration decisions to be based exclusively on court records. The appellant’s prior instruction was established, and the work was not disputed as reasonably incurred or reasonable in amount.
8. The 33 hours were remitted to the respondent for assessment, if not agreed, at the applicable junior rates, with an opportunity to check that there had been no duplication of effort with junior counsel. The £100 appeal fee was to be repaid.

The appeal was brought against the Determining Officer’s written reasons dated 29 April 2025. The High Court (Senior Court Costs Office) allowed the appeal in principle and remitted the disputed remuneration to the respondent for assessment, if not agreed.